The Challenge of Resilience in a Globalised World by NAVRACSICS Tibor et al.
JRC Mission
As the Commission’s in-house 
science service, the Joint 
Research Centre’s mission is
to provide EU policies with 
independent, evidence-based 
scientific and technical support 
throughout the whole policy cycle. 
Working in close cooperation
with policy Directorates-General, 
the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating 
innovation through developing 
new methods, tools and
standards, and sharing its 
know-how with the Member 
States, the scientific community 
and international partners.
JRC Science Hub
ec.europa.eu/jrc
EU_ScienceHubJRC Company PageJRCAudiovisualsScience@EC
Serving society
Stimulating innovation
Supporting legislation
The challenge of resilience
in a globalised world
Joint
Research
Centre
EUR 27280 EN
Report by the
Joint Research Centre
the European Commission’s
in-house science service
If you would like to learn more about the activities of the JRC, 
please contact:
Geraldine Barry
European Commission
Joint Research Centre
Communication Unit
Head of Unit
CDMA 04/167
1050 Brussels
Belgium
Brussels
Tel. +32 (0)2 29 74181
Fax +32 (0)2 29 85523
Ispra
Tel. +39 0332 78 9889
Fax +39 0332 78 5409
Contact: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/contact
Website: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc
A great deal of additional information on the European Union 
is available on the internet. It can be accessed through the 
Europa server (http://europa.eu/).
  
Contents
Foreword by European Commissioner T. Navracsics  2
1. Setting the Scene
A more resilient Europe and the role of science  V. Šucha 6
Why resilience matters  M. Wahlström 8
A business perspective    B.Stigson 10
A climate perspective: cutting emissions and creating jobs  A. Wijkman 12
2. The concept of resilience
The concept of resilience: a European perspective  S. Lechner 16
3. Resilience of supplies - the basic needs
Modelling the Energy Union: mission impossible?  M. Masera 20
Towards a resilient food production system  N. Hubbard 22
Water resilience: addressing water pressures and disruptions and the drivers behind them  G. Bidoglio 24
4. European resilience in action
Civil protection: better together – within Europe and globally  F. Fink-Hooijer 28
Nuclear safety: joint European reaction to the Fukushima accident  S. Abousahl 30
Financial solidarity  K. Regling 32
The Banking Union: calculating systemic risk across Europe  F. Campolongo 34
The EU Stability and Growth Pact: a multidimensional modelling challenge  M. Ratto 36
Health and pandemics: efficient EU responses by sharing knowledge  C. Nicholl 38
5. Upcoming challenges
Social resilience  G. Fischer 42
Geopolitics: common platforms for efficient EU crisis response  D. Al Khudhairy 44
Climate change: how to address a creeping crisis  M. Porter 46
Migration: European cooperation for resilience of the blue borders  A. Zampieri 48
Counter-terrorism: EU collaboration  O. Luyckx 50
6. Emerging technologies
Big data and the ‘Internet of Things’: research for Europe’s digital resilience  J-P. Nordvik 54
Can Europe become quantum-safe?  G. Lenhart 56
The Internal Market: protecting European innovation  A. Campinos 58
7. Conclusions and next steps
Measuring resilience to design innovative policies  E. Giovannini 62
Managing complexity: the key to resilience  S. Lechner 64
Global risk and global resilience  W. J. Ammann 66
Resilience through trilateral collaboration  J. Jacometti 68
 Authors 70
2Foreword
T. Navracsics
European Commissioner 
3As the EU recovers from the deepest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression, 
we have some time to reflect on how to 
better deal with the shocks and stresses 
our economies, societies and environment 
are increasingly being exposed to. We can 
now see more clearly how these shocks and 
stresses interact and sometimes reinforce 
each other. Therefore, we need to reflect on 
how to improve resilience in a more holistic 
way, systemically addressing all the risks 
to the safety and well-being of European 
citizens, whether they are threats to our 
economy, our society or our environment. 
Resilient economies and societies are able 
to absorb shocks and stresses, even those 
as serious as the recent economic crisis. 
They are organised in a way which strikes 
the right balance between economic and 
societal stability on the one hand, and 
knowledge-driven innovative dynamism 
on the other, without which the EU cannot 
thrive. This balance is fundamental to job 
creation, economic growth and environ-
mental sustainability. And it is a common 
challenge for everyone: EU institutions 
and EU Member States, the private sector, 
universities and research bodies, NGOs 
and European citizens.
Today’s challenges strongly test our 
capacity to cope with shocks and grow 
more resilient in the face of acute stress. 
Global change is taking place in an 
unpredictable way, and at an increasing 
pace. But we will have to prepare for 
the next economic or physical ‘tsunami’, 
the nature of which may currently be 
unknown to us. Faced with more and more 
difficulties in navigating the complexity 
of security, resource, climate and 
technology issues, individual countries 
cannot achieve everything – difficult 
choices have to be made and we need to 
work together.
Developing our knowledge base, exchan-
ging experiences, pooling resources and 
cooperating at EU level are therefore 
important ways to build a more resi-
lient Europe. The added value of such an 
approach will depend on our ability to 
strike the right balance between reaping 
the gains in the efficiency of a common 
approach and maintaining the diversity of 
our national systems to address specific 
national vulnerabilities.
DG JRC’s Resilience Report is the first-ever 
attempt to deepen our knowledge and 
develop a holistic approach by analysing 
various strategies for building resilience 
in the EU. The objective is to help EU 
Member States to better focus scarce 
resources on key vulnerabilities and, 
where beneficial, to join forces in building a 
more robust, resilient and prosperous EU. 
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6A more resilient Europe 
and the role of  science
V. Šucha
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Over the last decade, the resilience of 
the EU and its Member States has been 
tested by unprecedented economic shocks, 
major geopolitical shifts, climate-change-
related disasters and transnational security 
threats no one had foreseen. Against this 
backdrop, the EU has proved its resilience 
and demonstrated its capacity to provide 
collective and coordinated responses both 
internally and externally. Within the Union, it 
has undertaken a number of reforms which 
were necessary to protect the safety, security 
and well-being of its citizens. As a global 
actor, it has not shied away from playing 
a prominent role in international processes 
and in building consensus around a common 
agenda, as was thecase in the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
Nonetheless, more needs to be and can 
be done to build a more resilient Europe. 
The European Commission’s contribution 
to building a more resilient EU
Man-made threats (e.g. cyber-attacks, 
terrorism, external conflicts, major acci-
dents), natural hazards, financial and eco-
nomic instability, epidemics and pandemics, 
ener- gy insecurity, as well as global factors 
such as irregular migration, environmental 
degradation and climate change, continue 
to hover over the European project, with the 
potential to threaten the well-being of our 
societies and the wider world. Therefore, 
a sustained effort in “enhancing the EU’s 
resilience to crises, as well as its capacity 
to anticipate, prepare and respond to risks”, 
including transnational threats and global 
challenges, is essential to reach the ‘objec-
tives of the Europe 2020 strategy’ 1.
Since 2010, the European Commission 
has been working in at least 16 different 
policy areas related to resilience. It has 
been developing new frameworks for 
disaster risk reduction and civil protection 
(i.e. forest fires, floods, droughts and other 
hazards), food security and other humani-
tarian crises – especially in Africa – structural 
measures and instruments to improve 
financial and economic stability within the 
EU, responding to epidemics and pan- 
demics, as in the recent Ebola crisis, stress 
tests for nuclear plants, the safety of 
critical infrastructures, etc. 
Despite these laudable efforts, “current 
investments and policy responses remain 
insufficient to effectively address existing 
risks, let alone to keep pace with emerging 
challenges” 2. For a more resilient Europe, 
it is essential to set the right priorities and 
to focus scarce resources on key vulner-
abilities. Scientific knowledge can play an 
important role in this regard by supporting 
European policy- and decision-makers.
The role of science
Most policy processes follow a linear logic: 
they aim to optimise the desired outcome 
while seeking to reduce redundancies in the 
name of efficiency gains. This approach, 
geared towards reaching and maintaining 
the equilibrium, undermines the capacity 
“to absorb disturbance and reorganise while 
undergoing change” 3 within a system – be 
it social, economic or ecological in nature. 
As a result, the system “becomes brittle; 
vulnerable to unforeseen perturbations” 4. 
1 -  COM(2010) 2020 final, ‘EUROPE 
2020. A European strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.o?uri=CO
M:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF
2 -  COM(2014) 216 final, ‘The post 
2015 Hyogo Framework for Ac-
tion: Managing risks to achieve 
resilience’, page 4
3 -  Walker, B., Resilience: Interdisci-
plinary Perspectives on Science 
and Humanitarianism, Volume 1, 
March 2010
4 -  Ibid.
7Preventing these unintended conse-
quences of our policy interventions 
requires a thorough understanding of the 
dynamics and interconnectivity of our 
economy, society and environment. This 
is only possible by developing compre-
hensive and multidisciplinary approaches 
based on solid scientific evidence.
Science cannot entirely insulate societies 
from the adverse effects of imminent 
or latent risks. It can, however, provide 
data, knowledge, methods and tools 
critical to underpin well-informed policies 
and decisions, which can enhance the 
implementation of effective risk reduction, 
response and recovery measures by 
helping to set evidence-based priorities. 
Sound policies, preventive measures and 
timely interventions are crucial: they 
address vulnerabilities and allow systems 
to adapt and restore themselves, enabling 
them to retain their essential structures 
and functions.
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) – as 
the scientific arm of the European 
Commission – has been contributing 
to efforts at all stages of the EU policy 
process by providing scientific evidence 
and data to anticipate and reduce 
potential risks; analysis, scenario 
modelling and consultations to assess 
different policy and intervention options 
to adapt to changes induced by shocks; 
impact assessments; methods and 
tools to assist with the implementation 
of recovery measures and appraisal of 
policy frameworks and interventions, 
fostering learning to increase the EU’s 
adaptive capacity.
The way forward
Transdisciplinary scientific and technical 
know-how has proven particularly useful 
in building the EU’s resilience capacity, 
given the interconnectivity between our 
social, economic and ecological systems, 
on the one hand, and the need for multi-
hazard approaches to tackle separate 
but reinforcing risks, on the other. 
To further strengthen synergies and 
better exploit complementarities, DG JRC 
will bring together, and further develop 
in an interdependent manner, all its 
resilience-related research, expertise and 
activities. Together with the European 
Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) and the 
Directorate-General for Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), DG 
JRC is organising a dedicated conference 
on ‘Building a Resilient Europe in a 
Globalised World’ in September 2015. 
This conference aims to deepen the 
debate and to identify new activities that 
will help the EU in its efforts towards 
elaborating a comprehensive, collective 
and integrated approach to resilience.
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M. Wahlström
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)
One of the key learnings of the last 40 years 
of formal work on promoting and spreading 
a culture of disaster risk reduction around 
the world is how essential the concept of 
resilience has become to that work.
This was explicitly recognised by UN 
member states in 2005, following the 
Indian Ocean tsunami, when they adopted 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 
2005-2015: Building the resilience of 
nations and communities to disasters 5. 
The formula they came up with for building 
resilience consisted of five priorities focused 
on strong risk governance for overall HFA 
implementation; enhancing early-warning 
systems; using knowledge, innovation and 
education to build a culture of safety and 
resilience; reducing underlying risk factors; 
and strengthening disaster preparedness 
for effective response at all levels.
The reality of implementation over the 
last ten years has helped to deepen our 
understanding of where the gaps lie in 
building resilience and, hopefully, the 
adoption this year of the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030 6, 
the successor instrument to the HFA, will 
guide the world towards filling those gaps.
Within weeks of adopting the Sendai 
Framework at the Third UN World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, 
the international community received a 
nasty reminder of why resilience matters.
The earthquake on 25 April 2015, which 
claimed thousands of lives in Nepal and 
left millions homeless, told us why in an 
era of rapidly expanding cities and towns, 
and a growing population, it is essential 
that we have a better understanding of 
risk so we can make the essential shift 
from disaster management to disaster 
risk management.
A country like Nepal, in the lower reaches 
of the Human Development Index 7, has the 
benefit of a reservoir of resilience among its 
people, built up over centuries of experience 
in coping with floods, earthquakes and 
other natural hazards, but the pace of 
urbanisation allied with other factors such 
as population growth, climate change, 
environmental degradation and political 
instability, has overwhelmed that natural 
ability to respond and cope with disasters. 
In the case of Nepal, local solutions have 
been found to make communities resilient 
to earthquakes. The work of the Nepal 
Risk Reduction Consortium 8 and the Nepal 
Society for Earthquake Technology 9 has, 
for example, been essential in ensuring 
that hundreds of schools were able to 
withstand the impact of the 7.8 magnitude 
earthquake which struck in April.
This was achieved by recognising the fact 
that in an earthquake-prone country where 
engineers are rarely involved in supervising 
construction projects, the key to resilience 
was to train thousands of masons in simple 
but effective techniques for making schools 
safe and, at the same time, to give the 
children regular drills so they understood 
how to respond to disaster events and 
brought that knowledge into the broader 
community. Unfortunately, that effort was 
not brought to scale quickly enough and 
5 -  The United Nations Office for Dis-
aster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), 
Hyogo Framework for Action 
(HFA) 2005-2015: Building the 
resilience of nations and com-
munities to disasters, http://www.
unisdr.org /we/ inform/publ ica-
tions/1037
6 -  United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR), Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Re-
duction 2015-2030 ; Document A/
CONF.224/L.1, http://www.unisdr.
org/we/coordinate/hfa-post2015
7 -  United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), Human De-
velopment Index (HDI), http://
hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi
8 -  Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium: 
ht tp : / /un .org .np/coordinat ion-
mechanism/nrrc
9 -  Nepal Society for Earthquake 
Technology: http://www.nset.org.
np/nset2012/
9the failure to have in place a mechanism 
to ensure compliance with the building 
code has had tragic consequences.
These shortcomings are not peculiar to 
Nepal. We live in a world where loss of 
life from man -made and natural hazards 
is unacceptably high in both developed 
and developing countries. Economic losses 
whittle away development gains year after 
year, impacting on critical infrastructure, 
food security and vital services.
The Sendai Framework tells us there are 
four priority areas for action if we are to 
build on the achievements of the HFA decade 
and succeed in bringing about substantial 
reductions in loss of life, economic losses and 
the numbers of people affected by disasters.
First, disaster risk management needs to 
be based on an understanding of disaster 
risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, 
capacity, exposure of persons and assets, 
hazard characteristics and the environment.
Second, while a lot has been done to 
strengthen disaster risk governance over 
the last ten years, further work is required 
at the national, regional and global levels 
to guide, encourage and incentivise the 
public and private sectors to take action 
and address disaster risk.
A third requirement is public and private 
investment in disaster risk reduction through 
structural and non-structural measures 
which can also result in co-benefits such 
as economic growth and job creation. 
Target areas include early-warning 
systems, protecting productive assets, and 
ensuring the safety and functionality of 
critical infrastructure.
Finally, experience indicates that disaster 
preparedness needs to be strengthened 
for more effective response. Disasters 
have also demonstrated that the recovery, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase is 
an opportunity to build back better in a 
disaster-proof way. The world looks to the 
scientific community to help deliver much 
of this agenda, thereby ensuring that we 
make progress on reducing existing levels 
of risk and avoiding the creation of new risk. 
Scientific enterprise is key to supporting 
mitigation, preparedness and response 
measures, and the development of policy 
at the highest levels of government and 
providing the evidence of the benefits 
which ensue from investing in disaster risk 
reduction. Knowledge needs to be shared 
across all levels of society. No group should 
be excluded. Inclusion is the hallmark of 
a resilient society.
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A business perspective
B. Stigson
Former President, World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development
In today’s world, the technical, economic, 
social and political landscapes are changing 
fast and profoundly, and innovation in 
areas such as information technology, 
energy, biotechnology and life sciences are 
changing the agendas of both governments 
and business. In addition, demographic 
trends show a tremendous growth, primarily 
in the emerging economies which are 
expected to represent 85 % of the global 
population by 2050. The focus in these 
emerging economies will be on reducing 
poverty and improving the quality of life, 
so a substantial increase in consumption 
and emissions can be expected to burden a 
planet which is limited in its coping capacity.
An ageing population and urbanisation are 
adding to the picture and will introduce 
additional stresses: by 2050, the number 
of people aged 65 and over will globally 
rise from around 500 million to 1.6 billion, 
creating severe pressure on the societal 
infrastructure, and the degree of global 
urbanisation will rise from today’s 50 % 
to 70 % by then. Designing and building 
adequate social infrastructures and 
urban environments will therefore be a 
crucial issue for a future resilient society. 
The leading economies and companies 
have realised early that these needs 
will result in a strong future demand for 
resource-efficient, low-polluting products 
and services.
A green race is on
As a consequence, a green race has started 
about who will be the leading suppliers of 
these products and services. To win this 
race, countries need to transform their 
home market and build competence and 
scale in implementation that can underpin 
their exports to future global markets. 
For example, China has taken a determined 
effort in this sense, investing more than 
anybody else in transforming its economy 
and society. Their 13th Five-Year Plan, 
starting in 2016, has a clear focus on 
resource efficiency and pollution reduction.
The EU has been a global leader in green 
technology exports. However, in the view 
of the author, the overall transformation 
of the EU’s internal market towards higher 
resource efficiency and lower pollution 
needs to be accelerated to avoid losing 
global market shares. The traditionally 
strong exporter Germany might be an 
exception, but has strategically entered 
into a major bilateral cooperation with 
China on the theme of innovation.
Business and resilience
Resilience is the ability to adapt to major 
changes in the surrounding world, and 
resilience of ecosystems, society and 
business are closely linked. Business cannot 
succeed in societies that fail, and the global 
society cannot be sustainable and resilient 
without flourishing business, offering jobs 
and providing solutions to society’s needs. 
So for sustainable business, companies need 
to understand the resilience of societies 
on all levels, and CEOs have realised that 
a good knowledge of societies’ resilience 
mechanisms is essential to address new 
markets, build company strategies and 
develop sustainable business models. 
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Transformational changes in society 
can appear rapidly and make business 
models obsolete quickly, as the German 
‘Energiewende’ has painfully shown to the 
nuclear power plant operators.
WBCSD Vision 2050
In 2010, the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 10 
presented its report ‘Vision 2050’ 11, 
describing the future world with a vision 
formulated as “9 billion people living well 
within the limits of the planet”. Individual 
companies like DNV GL 12 or Unilever 13 have 
formulated similar ideas in the meantime. 
Vision 2050 outlines a pathway with major 
transformational changes to all aspects of 
the global society required for a sustainable 
future world. Analysing how these changes 
could happen, WBCSD concluded that the 
markets on their own were too slow to 
drive these transformational changes and 
that supportive government regulations 
were needed to succeed. As a consequence, 
WBCSD published a further report in 2012 
called Changing Pace: Public policy options 
to scale and accelerate business action 
towards Vision 2050 14.
Partnerships
No part of society can create a sustainable 
world on its own. Instead, we need new 
partnerships between governments, busi- 
ness, civil society and academia where 
each part is delivering on their specific 
responsibilities and roles:
•  Governments must create the regulatory 
framework that can stimulate actions 
towards resilient societies;
•  Business must innovate and implement 
actions for a resource-efficient, low- 
polluting world;
•  Civil society has a crucial role to support 
the difficult trade-offs between conflicting 
priorities that governments and business 
will be facing in their actions to build a 
resilient future;
•  Academia must educate leaders who can 
lead society toward a resilient world and 
stimulate science and innovation of new 
solutions;
•  Bringing all of the stakeholders together 
requires a coordinated action. The EU, 
based on its global leadership in green 
technology exports, has a major oppor-
tunity to take the lead. 10 -  World Business Council for Sus-
tainable Development (WBCSD): 
http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx
11 -  World Business Council for Sus-
tainable Development (WBCSD), 
Vision 2050: The new agenda 
for business, Atar Roto Presse 
SA, Switzerland, 2010, http://
w w w.wbcsdpub l i cat ions .org /
cd_f i les /datas /v ision_ac t ion /
vision_2050/pdf/V ision2050-
FullReport.pdf
12 -  DNV GL: https://www.dnvgl.com/
13 -  Unilever: http://www.unilever.com/
14 -  World Business Council for Sus-
tainable Development (WBCSD), 
Changing Pace: Public policy 
options to scale and accelerate 
business action towards Vision 
2050, 2012, http://www.wbcsd-
publications.org/cd_files/datas/
vision_action/vision_2050/pdf/
ChangingPace-FullReport.pdf
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A climate perspective: 
cutting emissions 
and creating jobs
A. Wijkman
The Club of Rome
It is more than 40 years since the Club 
of Rome 15 published its seminal study 
on the outlook for humanity, The Limits 
to Growth 16. Its key message was that a 
combination of resource depletion and 
pollution, if un-tackled, would ultimately 
bring the global economy down.
Unfortunately, this remarkable book was 
quickly seen as a threat to vested interests 
and the message fell on hostile ears. But 
the warning was prescient and the Club 
of Rome has remained committed to the 
task of crafting solutions to humanity’s 
systemic problems ever since.
At the centre of our current economic, 
social and environmental troubles lies a 
system of human development which – 
while seemingly productive in the short 
run (decades) – is essentially self- 
destructive in the long run. The need for 
continuous growth in material throughput 
– resources into the system, waste out of 
the system – promotes resource destruc-
tion, rising pollution, widening economic 
inequality and, because it is fixated on 
increasing labour productivity, structural 
unemployment. 
Worse, this system is greatly unjust. 
Today’s ecological overshoot stems 
mostly from meeting the demands of the 
wealthiest fifth of the population, who 
consume almost 80 % of the world’s 
economic output. The poorest fifth survive 
on just 2 %. With billions in poverty – 
and billions more to come – how can 
anyone honestly believe we can continue 
business as usual?
Economics as a discipline is based on a 
warped version of 19th century thinking. 
To quote William Rees: “Its intellectual 
founders, motivated by the remarkable 
success of Newtonian physics, set out 
explicitly to model economics as the 
‘mechanics of utility and self-interest’. The 
discipline consequently lost sight of the 
social context and purpose of economies 
and became totally abstracted from 
biological reality.” 17
For many decades, the scale of human 
activity was small relative to ‘the environ- 
ment’ and hence conventional economists 
could continue to ignore biophysical reality. 
But that is no longer possible. The combi-
nation of a rapidly changing climate, 
overstretched ecosystems and looming 
resource constraints should force even the 
most hard-nosed economists to reconsider 
their ideas. Yet most continue to describe 
our economies as a money flow with little 
or no reference to the world around us. 
This is like describing human physiology in 
terms of the circulatory system, ignoring 
the rest of the body.
We cannot address our social and ecological 
challenges unless we reform our economic 
thinking. We need to overhaul economics 
as an academic discipline and change 
the way nature is perceived. Our economies 
need to be seen as a sub-system of nature, 
not the other way around.
That will take time.
In the meantime, we have to reduce 
the damage we are doing to the planet 
15 -  The Club of Rome: http://www.
clubofrome.org/
16 -  Meadows D. H., Meadows D. L., 
Randers J., Behrens W. W. III, The 
Limits to Growth, New American 
Library, New York, 1972
17 -  Rees, W., Economics vs. the 
Economy, 23 June 2015, Post 
Carbon Institute: http://www.
postcarbon.org/economics-vs-
the-economy/
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and make our economic systems more 
resilient. The best way to achieve this is 
to cut our rate of industrial metabolism 
through decoupling.
Decoupling refers to the ability of an 
economy to grow without any corresponding 
increases in energy- and resource-use 
or environmental pressure. This is not a 
new concept, and there are many good 
examples of relative decoupling. But the 
gains made have often been eaten up by 
further economic growth and the so-called 
rebound effect. Examples of absolute 
decoupling are still rare.
This is where the circular economy comes 
in, where products are specifically designed 
for recycling, reuse, disassembly, and 
remanufacturing – rather than the ‘take, 
make and dispose’ model we have today.
The European Commission launched a 
flagship initiative A resource-efficient 
Europe 18  in 2011. Strong signals were sent 
to the business community that a shift 
towards the circular economy should be an 
important priority in the coming years.
The Juncker Commission has suggested 
withdrawing this proposal in the pretext 
of ‘better regulation’, which would have 
shown little understanding of the social 
and ecological challenges that lie ahead. 
Fortunately, the Commission has promised 
to relaunch the circular economy package 
before the end of 2015.
It is vitally important that president Juncker 
and his team fulfil this promise.
Recent studies by the Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation 19, by McKinsey 20 and by the 
Club of Rome illustrate the enormous 
benefits of a circular economy.
The Club of Rome study, for example, 
proves convincingly that it not only reduces 
carbon emissions but creates new jobs at 
the same time. Instead of mining coal and 
drilling oil, people are employed in building 
and maintaining clean-energy systems. 
There is vast potential to create millions 
of new jobs repairing, maintaining and 
updating products, too.
The shift towards a circular economy will 
not happen by itself. It needs governments 
to lower taxes on labour, increase them 
on raw materials, and to stop subsidising 
conventional energy.
 Setting the scene 
18 -  A resource-efficient Europe – 
Flagship initiative of the Europe 
2020 Strategy: http://ec.europa.
eu/resource-efficient-europe/
19 -  Ellen MacArthur Foundation: 
http://www.ellenmacarthurfoun-
dation.org/
20 -  McKinsey & Company: http://
www.mckinsey.com/
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The concept of  resilience: 
a European perspective
S. Lechner
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
The term resilience is used in literature 
in many different ways, but generally 
describes the property of a system (a 
society, a network, or even an individual) 
to successfully cope with changes. Such 
changes may originate from sudden shocks 
or crises, or may arise in small incremental 
steps which accumulate over time and 
impose severe stress on the system. A 
resilient system will cope with both types 
of change – shock and stress.
Resilience is not equivalent to sustain-
ability, which addresses the ability to 
cope with the predictable evolution of 
a system, and is currently often used to 
describe a system’s capacity not to be 
dependent on the indefinite availability of 
natural resources.
Resilience also goes beyond robustness 
which, by design, means stability and soli-
dity, but does not necessarily imply flexibility 
when exposed to unforeseen changes. A resi-
lient system should be robust against small 
changes and sustainable over both time and 
the predicted evolution of society. However, it 
should also be able to adapt dynamically to 
major changes while continuing to function, 
albeit in a modified way. A resilient system 
should also have enough flexibility to cope 
with black swan 21  events – unpredictable 
threats which are beyond our experience-
based imagination.
The most resilient systems are not based on 
a single central control or on monoculture 
structures, as such approaches would create 
a single point of failure. A truly resilient sys-
tem deploys a healthy combination of micro 
and macro structures, enabling it to react 
and adapt dynamically.
While investigating the resilience of 
different systems (marine environments, 
the financial sector, the internet, the 
power grid and even terror networks) 22, 
two additional mechanisms have been 
suggested as being important for resilience: 
the principle of clustering and willingness 
to embrace collaboration.
 
Clustering ensures short distances between 
entities, which enables them to support 
each other quickly in case of need. This 
means that in an emergency no time is 
lost by knocking on the doors of partners 
we are not familiar with, and that the 
structures which enable effective support 
are already in place.
Collaboration is a more general concept, 
involving sharing good practices, learning 
from each other’s actions and mistakes, 
and deploying diverse resources to address 
situations which require complementary 
capabilities, or even just a scaling-up 
of the response.
Interestingly, the European Union has 
structures which support several aspects 
of resilience:
•  The EU’s subsidiarity principle (as well 
as its motto ‘united in diversity’) are 
examples of a combination of centralised 
and national efforts, providing a unique 
basis for a balanced reaction to global 
shocks and stresses; 
•  In addition, the cluster principle is 
reflected well in the EU, where Member 
21 -  Nassim, Nicholas Taleb, The 
Black Swan: The Impact of the 
Highly Improbable, second edi-
tion, Penguin Books, 2010, ISBN 
978-0-141-03459-1
22 -  Zolli, A., Healy, A.M., Resilience: 
Why Things Bounce Back, Head-
line Publishing Group, London, 
2012, eISBN: 978-0-7553-
6035-2
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States are geographically close to 
each other. The short distances within 
Europe allow for regular contact, good 
neighbourhood relations within the Union, 
and for getting together quickly if so 
required. Also, the European Treaties have 
brought the EU Member States together 
under commonly agreed governance and, 
equally important, under shared values; 
•  Collaboration is also reflected well in 
the EU, which has been established as a 
solidarity union and maintains a govern- 
ment system within its three main insti-
tutions (European Commission, European 
Council and European Parliament), 
reflecting the needs and positions of all 
EU stakeholders.  
Although these points are not sufficient 
to ensure the resilience of the EU, they 
do provide a strong (and globally unique) 
basis for an efficient and balanced 
reaction to global shocks and stresses. The 
continuing challenge is to develop these 
capabilities over time and to apply them 
efficiently and effectively when required. 
Throughout its 50-year history, the EU 
has shown many times that it can respond 
positively and resiliently to major challenges.
We have even seen this in recent years: for 
both the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the 
‘ash cloud’ crisis of 2010 it was clear that 
an international response was required 
both for policy and for operation, and 
although the detailed policies and actions 
had not been defined in advance, the EU 
institutions provided a natural framework 
in which they could be developed. Many 
other examples could also be cited, 
ranging from the solidarity mechanism 
for mutual civil protection assistance, to 
exchanging information on pandemics, 
and to negotiating a gas deal with Russia 
during the winter of 2014-15. It is clear 
that in this highly complex interconnected 
world, no single EU Member State could 
have achieved these results alone. That 
is the nature of resilience, which requires 
accepted mechanisms and a trusted team.
18
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The resilience of the European energy sys-
tem presents many challenges that derive 
from its complexity. It was formed from the 
integration of existing national infrastruc-
tures and markets. Those national systems 
differ not only in their use of resources, but 
also in their management and regulation, 
in the formation of prices and in their prac-
tices regarding protection and security of 
supply. This diversity has been at the origin 
of the challenges concerning its integration. 
While national energy systems have been 
subjected to few major disruptions – excep-
tions being the 2003 blackout in Italy and 
the gas disruptions caused by the Russia-
Ukraine disputes – it is clear to policy- 
makers and industry alike that the central 
role of energy in society requires a deep 
understanding of all the causes and conse-
quences of potential disturbances to the 
security of supply.
In the light of this, the transition towards 
an Energy Union 23 demands a major 
assessment. On the one hand, the energy 
system has been exposed to dramatic 
changes in recent decades, including 
technological, regulatory and market 
transformations. On the other hand, the 
Energy Union has the ambition to further 
the EU’s capability to ensure secure, 
affordable and climate-friendly energy 
across Europe. 
Evolution of the European energy system 
has the following main characteristics: 
i)  Increasing interconnections among 
the national systems, resulting in 
more possibilities in terms of access 
to energy supplies while, at the same 
time, creating an opportunity to spread 
problems across borders; 
ii)  The growing use of electricity generated 
from renewables – features of these 
intermittent sources include significant 
variability, poor predictability, and their 
non-dispatchable nature, producing an 
electricity system which is becoming 
less reliable; 
iii)  The unbundling of energy system opera- 
tions, which originated in the liberalisation 
policies that requested the separation 
of functional activities in the previously 
vertically integrated industry; this multi- 
plied the number of industrial actors, 
thereby discontinuing the former direct 
technical and market links between the 
various industrial stages; 
iv)  The escalating use of information and 
communication technologies at all 
stages of the energy industry, inside 
installations, across the value chain, 
and in the links with all stakeholders, 
including end-users. This massive intro- 
duction of ICT expanded the possibilities 
for operations and efficiency, but created 
opportunities for new cyber-threats. 
On the one hand, the Energy Union will 
require a robust investment effort into 
new infrastructure to improve the free 
flow of energy across borders, mainly from 
renewable sources. This investment will 
have to be accompanied by new regula- 
tion of the retail market, with greater 
emphasis on citizens’ capabilities, and a 
low- carbon economy; and innovation in 
new business processes and the insertion 
of new technologies (e.g. storage).
Modelling 
the Energy Union: 
mission impossible?
M. Masera
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
23 -  Energy Union: http://ec.europa.
eu/priorit ies/energy-union/in-
dex_en.htm
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All these factors justify the initial state-
ment above: the European energy system 
is already a complicated socio-economic 
and technical system, and is becoming 
more complex. Consequently, the resilience 
of the Energy Union is not responsive to 
simple answers and cannot be summarised 
in one judgement or one indicator. Model-
ling the Energy Union from the resilience 
standpoint requires taking into considera-
tion the energy system’s many layers and 
their interactions, including: the physical 
infrastructure required from the energy 
source to the end consumer; the cyber 
infrastructure; the regulatory and institu-
tional aspects that define the procedures 
and rules governing the system; the retail 
and wholesale markets; the industrial 
actors and end-users (households, industry, 
commerce) and their behaviour; and the 
environmental context that defines factors 
such as the capacity of renewable sources 
(solar, wind, hydro) and emission limits.
In addition, the models will have to 
include the vulnerabilities of the different 
elements, the potential hazards and 
threats that can affect the system, and 
the ability of both the Member States and 
the energy industry to prevent adverse 
events, including the mitigation of their 
effects. Of these elements, the technical 
systems are the best understood, based 
on the operators’ direct knowledge and the 
national regulators’ follow-up. EU energy 
markets have been the subject of different 
studies, but their evolving character limits 
what can be said today about their future 
resilience. However, their weak point 
remains the integration of the many 
components, as previously discussed. 
In addition, from the experience gained 
in the study of critical energy infra-
structure during the last decade by the 
Member States and industry, one can 
highlight the challenges regarding the 
sharing of information on vulnerabilities, 
hazards and threats. These constitute 
very sensitive pieces of information that 
touch national security.
Therefore, producing an overall model 
of the Energy Union that can help in 
identifying issues and potential solutions 
to its resilience is not a straightforward 
task. It will require advanced science in 
various fields, but also political resolution 
and the confluence of Member States and 
industry on this objective.
Resilience of supplies - the basic needs
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Food security exists when “… all people, 
at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life…” 24
The main issues 
for EU food security
Being the world’s largest producer and 
exporter of food, the EU is self-sufficient 
in meat, dairy products and cereals. But it 
is also the second largest global importer 
of food, comprising mainly fish, vegeta-
bles, fruit and animal feedstuff. Ensuring 
supply-chain stability in the countries 
of origin, many of which are developing 
countries, is as essential as ensuring the 
EU’s financial capacity to afford imported 
products at international market prices. 
Domestic agricultural production is sensi- 
tive to extreme weather events which 
are expected to become more frequent 
if the current trends in climate change 
continue. An additional critical weakness 
is the dependence on imported energy 
and agricultural inputs such as fertiliser.
The majority of households within the EU 
can afford sufficient and high-quality food. 
Nevertheless, approximately 50 million 
people (9 % of the population) in Europe 
face difficulties in obtaining enough high-
quality food, a situation partly addressed 
by the rise in charitable services such as 
‘food banks’. Within this 9% figure, there 
are large disparities between countries, 
ranging from 40 % in parts of Eastern 
Europe to as low as 3 % in the Netherlands 
and Sweden, generally reflecting inequali-
ties in household income levels. Important 
issues in the EU food system include food 
safety and the rise in obesity, both often 
resulting from individual choices (lifestyle, 
sanitation, dietary habits) rather than from 
supply and provision.
Towards a resilient 
food production system
The EU food balance sheet is largely 
positive in most essential food products, 
with food availability being achieved 
through local production and imports. 
Food access refers to the physical and 
economic access to food, including the 
quality and efficiency of the food distri-
bution system. Generally speaking, poorer 
people buy food of lower quality, and the 
nutritional content and safety of food has 
an impact on the body’s effective use of it.
Availability, access and utilisation are 
three key pillars of food security, to which 
stability can be added. Stability means 
having adequate food at all times, while 
the resilience approach emerged as the 
appropriate framework to address the 
capacity of countries and households to 
cope at all times with shocks that affect 
the food system. Shocks and threats 
relate to weather variability, economic 
crises, climatic change and price volatility, 
security risks affecting the supply and 
distribution chain, and to food safety issues 
including crop/animal diseases and safety 
within the processing chain. European 
integration helps to diffuse the impact 
of most shocks by providing solidarity 
Towards a resilient  
food production system
N. Hubbard
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
24 -  UN Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO), Rome Decla-
ration on World Food Security 
and World Food Summit Plan 
of Action, (Rome, 13 Novem-
ber 1996), UN Doc. WFS 96/3 
(1996), para. 1, http://www.
fao.org /docrep/003/w3613e/
w3613e00.htm
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mechanisms if one or more Member States 
should be affected by a crisis.
Across the 28 EU Member States, the com-
mon agricultural policy 25 (CAP) enables 
shortfalls in production in one area to be 
balanced by excess production elsewhere. 
By operating across a large geographi-
cal area, the related risks (particularly 
weather-related ones) can be more evenly 
spread. The policy is increasingly market- 
oriented, enabling market forces to 
respond to actual supply and demand. 
Monthly production forecasts, success-
fully developed by the JRC over 20 years, 
enable timely information to be fed into 
the management of stocks and included in 
the market outlook. Building resilience for 
food security is about providing countries 
and households with the means to develop 
three capacities: the capacity to absorb a 
shock, the capacity to adapt to a change 
induced by a shock and, ultimately, the 
capacity to transform the system to better 
resist shocks in the future.
Future challenges
The answer to achieving greater resilience 
in our food supply is dependent upon 
the global situation of producers, prices 
and trade. The extension of crop fore- 
casting to the global scale allows for 
greater transparency as regards what 
is happening, leading to fewer market 
shocks (sudden price fluctuations), and 
a reduction in the damage that can be 
caused by market speculation.
The EU is the largest donor of support to 
sustainable agriculture and food security 
in those developing countries that are 
prone to recurrent shocks. The resilience 
approach provides the framework to 
tackle food insecurity with long-lasting 
solutions aiming to alleviate poverty 
and ensure economic growth in the 
least-developed countries. Other benefits 
include creating a favourable environment 
for trade and the reaffirmation of the 
EU’s commitment to human rights and 
solidarity. The resilience approach to 
development is nascent, seeking to 
guide the programming, monitoring and 
evaluation of interventions and policies. 
The JRC is contributing to two respective 
EU initiatives: ‘Supporting the Horn of 
Africa’s Resilience’ (SHARE) 26 and ‘Global 
Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) – Sahel 
and West Africa’ 27. 
25 -  CAP: http://ec.europa.eu/agricul-
ture/cap-post-2013/
26 -  Supporting the Horn of Af-
rica’s Resilience (SHARE): http://
ec .europa .eu /echo /what / hu-
manitarian-aid/resilience/horn-
of-africa-share_en
27 -  Global Alliance for Resilience 
(AGIR) – Sahel and West Africa: 
http: //www.oecd.org/site/rpca/
agir/
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Water is essential to life, and one of the 
first concerns in any form of organised 
society has always been to secure a reliable 
supply of clean water. In recent decades, 
however, there has been an increasing 
realisation that human activities signifi-
cantly modify the water cycle at different 
levels from local to global. A recent global 
risk-perception survey has ranked water 
crises as the top driver of societal risk in 
terms of their far-reaching economic and 
environmental consequences 28.
Water resilience is about maintaining 
water resources in a condition enabling 
societal development in the face of the 
severe disturbances induced by humans. 
Such disruptions in water supply may be 
caused by changes in the capacity of the 
land to feed precipitation through plant 
transpiration, soil sealing, deforestation 
or excessive water abstraction causing 
the collapse of aquatic ecosystems 29. 
In the past, such changes occurred exten- 
sively and we are now in urgent need of 
preserving the remaining functioning 
systems, and rehabilitating those that 
have been degraded.
In order to build water-resilient societies, 
water-resource management must 
address not only the pressures on water, 
but also their drivers, beginning with 
the global economy itself. The global 
production of commodities needs to 
comply with the principles of sustainable 
and efficient water use, ensuring that 
water demand from the different 
economic sectors meets water availa-
bility. If we keep allowing parts of the 
world to disrupt the water cycle, this will 
eventually affect Europe through the 
global climatic impact of change, and 
the resulting socio-economic instability 
that may arise in several regions. 
Individual European countries do not have 
the capacity to influence global markets, 
but the EU has already demonstrated 
that common policies may have a strong 
global outreach (as in the case of chemical 
regulation, whereby importing substances 
to Europe requires the global industry 
to undertake sound environmental com- 
patibility testing).
Another aspect of water resilience that 
requires supra-national governance is the 
fact that, from the local perspective of a 
region or river basin, it is always possible 
to some extent to offset impacts on 
water resources through ‘piracy’ on 
water resources in a bordering region. 
One revealing example is the North 
American West 30, where economic 
development has put entire water 
systems at risk of collapse. Until now, 
water has been assured in that region at 
the cost of depleting resources needed 
by users downstream, which will not be 
possible over long periods in the future. 
Similar examples can be found all over 
the world. Only internationally agreed, 
transboundary water governance ensures 
protection from this ever-emerging risk. 
River basins in Europe are, for the most 
part, transboundary. Just like energy, 
carbon and steel in the aftermath of 
World War II, joint governance of water 
management is an essential prerequisite 
Water resilience: 
addressing water pressures 
and disruptions 
and the drivers behind them
G. Bidoglio
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
28 -  World Economic Forum. 2015. 
Global Risks 2015, 10th Edition. 
Geneva: World Economic Forum; 
ht t p : / /w w w.weforum .org /re -
ports/global-risks-report-2015
29 -  Rockström, J., Falkenmark, M., 
Folke, C., Lannerstad, M., Barron, 
J., Enfors, E., Gordon, L., Heinke, 
J., Hoff, H., Pahl-Wostl, C., Water 
Resilience for Human Prosper-
ity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, May 2014
30 -  Reisner, M., Cadillac Desert: The 
American West and Its Disap-
pearing Water, Revised Edition, 
Penguin Books, June 1993
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for development to avoid controversies 
that may turn out to be highly divisive 
if not addressed at a continental rather 
than national scale.
European legislation on water is highly 
advanced and integrated. The Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) 31 and related 
directives provide for the key principles of 
water governance at the catchment scale. 
These include the obligation for Member 
States to preserve the status of all water 
bodies in good ecological condition so that 
they may contribute a sufficient supply 
of good-quality water as required for 
sustainable, balanced and equitable water 
use. With all EU Member States committed 
to achieving the objectives of the WFD, 
countries are addressing domestic water 
supply issues while preserving resources 
equitably for downstream regions.
While the WFD’s aims are clearly 
set out, its practical implementation 
requires consideration of a broad array 
of scientific, technical, economic and 
governance aspects, and calls for an 
in-depth understanding of the socio-
ecological systems defining European river 
basins. This requires extensive research 
that attains to both the advancement 
of individual scientific disciplines (e.g. 
better characterisation of what is ‘good 
ecological status’), and to the capacity to 
deliver cost-effective solutions (e.g. use 
of natural processes to regulate water 
quantity and quality). Working together on 
comparable methods of water resource 
assessment and solutions appraisal is 
a significant value added from the EU 
dimension in terms of efficiency.
In future, water will increasingly demon-
strate its nature of limiting factor on all 
human activities. Therefore, management 
of water will become more and more 
interlinked with that of land, energy, food 
and ecosystems, and consequently water 
resilience will become a fundamental 
challenge to be addressed through cross-
cutting approaches at EU level.
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31 -  Directive 2000/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 October 
2000 establishing a frame-
work for Community action in 
the field of water policy, Official 
Journal L 327 , 22/12/2000 P. 
0001 – 0073: http://eur-lex.
europa .eu / legal-content /EN /
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060
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Civil protection: 
better together – 
within Europe and globally
F. Fink-Hooijer
European Commission, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
In recent years, the world has been hit 
by a series of mega-disasters: from a 
destructive typhoon in the Philippines, to 
severe flooding in the Western Balkans, the 
Ebola epidemic or the recent Nepal quake.
Multi-hazard disasters, such as the triple 
disaster (earthquake, tsunami and nuclear 
incident) that hit Japan a few years 
ago, can have long-lasting, devastating 
effects on the people, their livelihood, the 
environment and economic resilience.
Climate change, population growth, urbani-
sation and industrial development mean 
that disasters strike more often and cause 
more harm to people and economies. 
As the world is increasingly connected, and 
our economies interdependent, disasters 
can have damaging cross-border effects. 
At the same time, the economic crisis 
squeezes resources available for disaster 
management. By all accounts, these 
trends are likely to continue and the EU 
is not spared. The average economic cost 
of disasters in Europe is approximately 
EUR 10 billion/year.
In the face of such challenges, cooperation 
in civil protection is more important than 
ever. Since 2001, the EU, together with the 
Member States, has been developing the 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 32, 
which provides a comprehensive framework 
for EU civil protection cooperation in disaster 
prevention, preparedness and response.
The operational heart of the UCPM is the 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre 
(ERCC) 33, which is available on a 24/7 basis 
and is primarily responsible for the EU’s 
civilian disaster response coordination 
both inside and outside the European 
Union. As part of the UCPM, the EU has 
also developed a network of 24/7 contact 
points in all Member States, a common 
information exchange system, has organ- 
ised the Member States’ assistance into 
interoperable and flexible emergency 
intervention modules, and provides for 
trainings and exercises.
EU cooperation makes sense and a real 
difference. First, vital assets and expertise 
can be deployed, providing the most 
effective response possible. Second, the EU 
is in a position to efficiently coordinate the 
deployment of different types of resources. 
Well-intentioned, but uncoordinated assis- 
tance may be ineffective or get in the way 
of response efforts. Third, joint efforts 
can be more cost-effective. Finally, for 
disasters in third countries, the better the 
EU organises itself internally, the easier it 
can integrate into an overall relief effort 
coordinated by the United Nations.
The need for cooperation in disaster 
response has been further emphasised with 
the introduction of the EU Treaty-based 
Solidarity Clause 34, which sets out an 
option for the Union and its Member States 
to provide assistance to another Member 
State which is the victim of a terrorist 
attack or a natural or man-made disaster. 
Response is only one part of disaster 
management. An important effort within 
our civil protection work is to contribute 
to building resilient societies. In this 
respect, we are taking a leading role by 
32 -  EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
(UCPM): http://ec.europa.eu/
e cho / w hat /c i v i l - p r o t e c t ion /
mechanism_en
33 -  The Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre: http://
e c . e u r o p a . e u / e c h o / w h a t /
c iv i l -protec t ion /emergency-
response-coordination-centre-
ercc_en
34 -  Joint Proposal for a Coun-
cil Decision on the arrange-
ments for the implementation 
by the Union of the Solidarity 
clause /* JOIN/2012/039 final 
- 2012/0370 (NLE) */. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012JC0039
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contributing to a comprehensive disaster 
management strategy through different 
initiatives on prevention, preparedness 
and response, all aiming to enhance the 
Union’s resilience. The prevention and 
preparedness efforts have in particular 
been put in the spotlight with the new 
UCPM legislation, in effect since 2014.
The new legislation makes prepar-
edness and prevention mandatory. By 
the end of 2015, all Member States will 
have to carry out risk assessments so 
as to know the threats to citizens and 
economies. Member States will also 
need to assess how well equipped they 
are to deal with these threats. This will 
in turn allow any gaps in the collective 
European response to be identified. In 
cases of temporary shortcomings to 
deal with extraordinary disasters, the EU 
can co-finance the standby of necessary 
assets. In case of structural gaps, the 
EU can provide financial support to 
fill these gaps. In addition, to further 
increase our response, a voluntary 
pool of pre identified Member States’ 
assets has been set up. It is available 
for immediate deployment. In the EU’s 
quest to build a more resilient society, 
cooperation is the only way forward.
No country is rich or fit enough to deal 
with this new reality on its own. Therefore, 
the EU also cooperates with candidate 
countries and potential candidates, other 
neighbouring countries, and major partners 
such as China and the United States. 
Cooperation with all levels of the 
government and with partners such 
as the scientific community is another 
important element. The challenge is to 
find effective ways of linking up all the 
players that have a responsibility for 
disaster management and to foster an 
exchange of knowledge and best practice 
at all levels, from local communities, to 
scientists and researchers to interna-
tional organisations.
Strengthening resilience is and will 
continue to be at the heart of the 
EU’s disaster risk management policy. 
Through cooperation, the EU has built 
the foundations that allow us to 
successfully address the increasing 
fragility of our world.
European resilience in action
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Nuclear safety: 
joint European reaction 
to the Fukushima accident  
S. Abousahl
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Fukushima illustrated that the probability 
of severe nuclear accidents should not be 
seen as negligible. Until 2011, the enhanced 
safety records of modern nuclear power 
plants tended to show that events that 
would lead to a major detrimental impact 
on the environment were somewhat 
hypothetical. The major accident at Three 
Mile Island in the United States in the late 
1970s had only marginal consequences 
outside the plant in the end. And although 
lessons were also learnt from Chernobyl, 
this accident occurred in an installation 
which, to a certain extent, was considered 
‘out of the scope’ – its intrinsic design and 
operation mode dating back to the Soviet 
era were considered as much less safe.
Very soon after the Fukushima accident, 
the European Council called for a compre-
hensive review of the safety of EU nuclear 
power plants. ‘Stress tests’ were conducted 
under the auspices of the European Nuclear 
Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) 35 and 
the European Commission. They were aimed 
primarily at investigating the resistance of 
the installations to all types of external 
hazards, of natural or man¬made origin, 
and to undertake an in-depth assessment 
of the consequences of a possible incident. 
In the course of these stress tests, several 
areas were identified for improvement in all 
EU installations. National nuclear regulatory 
authorities have drawn up action plans on 
this basis, which have been peer-reviewed 
by experts from EU countries and the 
European Commission. 
The European Council further amended the 
Nuclear Safety Directive 36 to strengthen 
safety standards and improve supervision 
of nuclear facilities. For the first time the 
prevention of significant radioactive releases 
is set as a clear nuclear safety objective. 
The new legislation also introduces 
a system of European peer reviews. 
The effectiveness of the combined way 
in which the stress tests were conducted 
showed European resilience, and several 
countries outside the EU either partic-
ipated in, or took inspiration from, the 
European approach. 
But Fukushima and the stress tests also 
demonstrated that there is still much 
work to be done to better prepare us for a 
nuclear emergency. In the case of a major 
accident, a release of radioactivity can have 
geographically widespread consequences. 
And experience shows that, even when 
long-distance contamination is measured 
at levels far below the threshold to have an 
effect on health, authorities must still be 
prepared to address public concern. Being 
jointly prepared for nuclear emergencies 
is a key issue for the EU. With relatively 
small countries situated close together, 
dense populations and high concentrations 
of nuclear installations in some areas, any 
accident causing a significant radioactive 
release is likely to impact on adjacent 
countries within a short period.
The revised Council Directive laying down 
basic safety standards for protection 
against the dangers of exposure to ionising 
radiation was adopted at the end of 2013 37 
and includes several requirements aiming 
to better coordinate and communicate 
radiation monitoring, prevention and 
35 -  European Nuclear Safety Regula-
tors Group (ENSREG):   
http://www.ensreg.eu/
36 -  Council Directive 2014/87/EUR-
ATOM of 8 July 2014 amending 
Directive 2009/71/Euratom es-
tablishing a Community frame-
work for the nuclear safety of 
nuclear installations  
http: //eur-lex .europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELE
X:32014L0087&from=EN
37 -  Council Directive 2013/59/
Euratom of 5 December 2013 
laying down basic safety stand-
ards for protection against the 
dangers arising from exposure 
to ionising radiation, and re-
pealing Directives 89/618/Eur-
atom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/
Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 
2003/122/Euratom  
http: //eur-lex .europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2
014:013:FULL&from=EN
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post-accident actions. The Directive has 
to be implemented by the Member States 
by February 2018. As a consequence, 
EU Member States are assessing the 
practical ways of harmonising and 
integrating the coordination of nuclear 
emergency response arrangements. 
For many years, the JRC has provided 
both operational and scientific support 
to nuclear emergency preparedness and 
response in Europe, and can thus play 
an active role in current developments. 
JRC expertise and tools range from the 
EU’s system for early notification of a 
nuclear accident or event (ECURIE) 38, 
the assessment of reactor accidents, 
the potential damages and releases, 
and the real-time collection of environ-
mental radiation levels at a European 
scale (EURDEP) 39, to the harmonisation of 
measurement methods and information 
exchange for radiological monitoring of 
the environment and food chain. 
The JRC has rapidly addressed some 
new specific R&D needs, which were 
triggered by the accident and the actual 
situation in Fukushima, including a better 
understanding of the behaviour of both 
the reactors and the releases, and the 
characterisation of damaged components 
to facilitate a safe recovery. 
Four years after Fukushima, Japan is 
recovering step by step from the major 
nuclear accident that has affected the 
country. Of all the issues to be addressed, 
confidence among the Japanese popula- 
tion in the measures taken is probably 
the most delicate endeavour. In the 
case of any major crisis within Europe, a 
coordinated EU approach will not only 
make the response and subsequent 
recovery more effective, but it will also 
improve public understanding in the 
actions undertaken.
38 -  European Community Urgent 
Radiological Information Ex-
change (ECURIE): http://rem.jrc.
ec .europa .eu/RemWeb/act ivi-
ties/Ecurie.aspx
39 -  European Radiological Data Ex-
change Platform (EURDEP):  
https://eurdep.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
Basic /Pages/Public /Home/De-
fault.aspx
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Financial solidarity
K. Regling
European Stability Mechanism
Macroeconomic and financial resilience is a 
public good that requires collective action 
in a monetary union. It relies on the 
ability to weather shocks, minimise losses 
and, in a more dynamic manner, to guide 
the economy towards recovery and growth. 
The great European recession revealed 
economic and financial vulnerabilities and 
institutional weaknesses in the monetary 
union’s design. European leaders reacted 
promptly, reviewed the crisis management 
strategy and devised remedial solutions, 
such as strengthening the rules on deficit 
and debt, and addressing weaknesses of 
the financial sector through the Banking 
sector through the Banking Union 40.   
European policy-makers rapidly established 
the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) 41 to provide financial support to 
Member States that lost market access, and 
later on the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) 42 as the euro-area’s permanent 
crisis-resolution mechanism. The ESM has 
been in operation since 8 October 2012. It 
has a maximum lending capacity of EUR 
500 billion, more than EUR 450 billion of 
which is still available.
The ESM’s mission is to provide financial 
assistance to ESM members experiencing 
or threatened by severe financing problems 
to safeguard the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and of its members. 
By the end of 2014, in less than four years, 
EUR 233 billion had been disbursed by the 
two institutions to five countries. This is 
three times as much as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 43 disbursed globally 
in the same period. The ESM raises funds 
by issuing debt instruments, which are 
purchased by investors all over the world. 
The proceeds enable the ESM to provide 
loans or credit lines to countries when they 
face uncertain market access or cannot 
finance at affordable prices. The ESM 
can also help to break the link between 
financial problems in the banking sector 
and the government. It can extend loans to 
the government to rescue banks, or in very 
extreme cases, also invest itself in banks.
There are four important results of the 
EFSF’s and ESM’s activities:
First, several countries would have left the 
euro area without the financial support 
from the EFSF and ESM, and Europe would 
be in a different situation today. During 
the crisis, investors had lost confidence in 
some peripheral euro-area economies and 
European financial support allowed these 
countries to finance the budget, and to 
protect their banking system and operate 
within the common monetary system.
Second, EFSF and ESM programmes 
have helped countries to become reform 
champions. ESM financial assistance 
is linked to beneficiary Member States 
addressing weaknesses in their economies 
through reforms which are jointly agreed 
by that Member, the European Commission, 
in liaison with the European Central Bank 44 
and, where applicable, the International 
Monetary Fund. These reforms may be 
painful in the short-run, but they are 
indispensable to regain competitiveness 
and overcome macroeconomic fiscal 
imbalances which built up over time, and 
40 -  Banking Union: http://ec.europa.
eu/finance/general-policy/bank-
ing-union/index_en.htm
41 -  European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF): http://www.efsf.
europa.eu/about/index.htm
42 -  European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM): http://www.esm.europa.
eu/
43 -  International Monetary Fund 
(IMF): http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/index.htm
44 -  European Central Bank (ECB): 
h t t p s : / / w w w.ecb .europa .eu /
home/html/index.en.html
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to strengthen the economy’s growth 
potential. According to international 
institutions, the EFSF/ESM programme 
countries are among the top reformers 
in the EU and even among industrialised 
OECD countries overall 45. Therefore, they 
are best positioned for economic growth 
if they continue their reform paths.
Third, the ESM and EFSF assistance 
not only provides emergency financing 
against conditionality, but also includes 
substantial solidarity. Both institutions 
provide loans at very favourable conditions 
which create fiscal space in beneficiary 
countries and improve a country’s ability 
to repay its debt. The maturities of our 
loans became very long, stretching from 
an average of 12.5 years for Spain to 
more than 32 years for Greece. Moreover, 
the interest rate charged is very low, 
currently amounting to an average of 
1.5 %. For Greece, payment obligations 
to European creditors over the years until 
2023 have become minimal. Based on 
results for 2013, EFSF lending produces 
annual budget savings of EUR 8.5 billion 
per year, or the equivalent of 4.5 % of 
Greek GDP year after year.
The EFSF and ESM are part of the 
multi-pronged crisis response, which 
more broadly reduces the risk of 
future crises. The strengthening of 
fiscal and economic governance aims 
to strengthen coordination of fiscal 
policies, tightens monitoring of national 
budgets and increases the possibilities 
of the European Commission to enforce 
its views. The financial system, and in 
particular the banking sectors, have 
been made more secure; supervision 
has been strengthened through new 
European institutions, and investors have 
participated in the burden-sharing when 
problems emerged. This sets the right 
incentives for more responsible behaviour 
and avoids as much as possible bank 
rescues with taxpayers’ money.
The cumulative effect of the ESM as 
an effective future firewall and of these 
reforms has substantially improved the 
resilience of the euro area.
45 -  Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
(OECD): http://www.oecd.org/
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The Banking Union: 
calculating systemic risk 
across Europe
F. Campolongo
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
During the turmoil that has characterised 
the world’s financial markets over the 
past few years, the EU’s financial system 
encountered a breakdown in trust and 
functionality that spilled over into the 
economy at large, undermining economic 
development, growth and prosperity.
In reaction to the crisis, European financial 
regulators have been working together 
across national borders to secure a 
resilient financial system. It needs the 
ability to bounce back or recover quickly 
from the effects of systemic shocks so 
that the consequences of widespread 
failures and the spillover effects are felt 
less intensely by those affected, whether 
they are financial institutions that have 
become insolvent, non-financial businesses 
enduring a freeze in the supply of bank 
credit, or households with value stored 
in failed financial institutions. The need 
for ensuring a resilient financial system 
is especially prominent in the EU, where 
the banking sector is huge. The sector’s 
total assets amount to roughly 349 % 
of the EU’s GDP, in contrast to 78 % 
of GDP in the USA and 174 % of GDP in 
Japan. Hence, there is an even more 
pressing need to ensure a financial system 
able to withstand possible future shocks of 
the magnitude of the 2008 banking crisis.
Many of the very substantial regulatory 
changes in response to the financial crisis 
have aimed at making banks more stable 
and resilient and, subsequently, the banking 
system safer and better able to contribute 
to sustainable growth. All of these changes 
were commonly agreed on the basis of 
treaties signed by the members of the 
EU. The amount and quality of capital and 
liquid assets that banks must hold has been 
substantially increased. The protection 
for depositors has been enhanced. The 
intra-bank interconnections have also been 
simplified with significantly more central 
clearing of derivatives. Standards across 
all EU trading venues and transparency 
requirements have been strengthened.
Moreover, a major step towards a resilient 
banking system has been undertaken by 
countries in the euro zone (and any other EU 
countries that choose to join) to establish 
a Banking Union in the euro zone, with a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 46 and 
a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 47. 
The Banking Union significantly enhances 
the supervision of banks, both at a micro 
and macro level, in the euro area and other 
participating Member States, and helps 
to remove the strong link between banks 
and national governments that weakened 
banks and sovereign debt in some Member 
States during the crisis. This framework 
guarantees stronger, safer banks, and 
brings an end to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
paradigm, ensuring that the banking 
sector is in a good position to fulfil its 
role in funding the real economy, as well 
as contributing to deep and liquid capital 
markets, which are key for economic 
growth. 
The Banking Union is an obvious example 
of European added value: acting autono-
mously, Member States would not be 
able to achieve the same goal. The 
rising globalisation of financial services 
46 -  Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM): http://ec.europa.eu/fi-
nance/general-policy/banking-
union/single-supervisory-mech-
anism/index_en.htm
47 -  Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM): http://ec.europa.eu/fi-
nance/general-policy/banking-
union/single-resolution-mecha-
nism/index_en.htm
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has strengthened the interconnection 
between financial institutions, with 
positive effects on the efficiency of 
the global financial system but also 
increasing the risks of cross-market and 
cross-country disruptions, highlighting 
the need to act at central level to ensure a 
financial system that is entirely resilient. 
The Banking Union promotes financial 
integration, thereby reducing systemic 
risk and the likelihood of a new crisis. 
It also guarantees a mega insurance plan 
that covers banks and countries against 
the materialisation of systemic risks, 
thus reducing the magnitude of any crisis 
that might occur.
The Banking Union is an important 
achievement, and regulators and scien- 
tists are continuing to work to strength-
ening its effectiveness by uncovering 
and reducing systemic risk. Given the 
complexity of the banking system’s 
structure, the identification and quanti-
fication of systemic risk remains very 
challenging. The scientific community has 
largely contributed to and is continuing 
to support regulators in better identifying 
and measuring such risk, understanding 
its drivers, and putting in place regulation 
to reduce and mitigate it.
While the immediate crisis has passed, 
building lasting confidence in the global 
economy means addressing the causes 
of the crisis and making the system more 
resilient against future shocks. Through the 
Banking Union, European regulators took 
an important step towards a safer, more 
resilient global financial system, ensuring 
that if a new crisis were to arise, Europe 
would be better prepared to respond, 
while common efforts are continuing to 
further improve EU resilience.
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The EU Stability 
and Growth Pact: 
a multidimensional 
modelling challenge
M. Ratto
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
In macroeconomics, resilience refers to 
the capacity of a society to minimise 
welfare losses following adverse shocks 
such as worldwide oil price rises or 
turbulence on global currency markets. 
High resilience implies economic stability, 
which is most desirable since stability 
encourages economic growth, prosperity, 
and employment. Economic stability is 
one of the main objectives enshrined in 
the management of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) 48.
One important variable that influences 
the degree of resilience of EU economies 
is the level of public debt. EU Member 
States with higher debt levels were less 
resilient to the 2008-2009 financial crisis 49 
as high debt levels reduce the room to 
implement discretionary fiscal policies and 
increase uncertainty about the direction of 
future policies, thus preventing smoother 
adjustments. Conversely, countries with 
lower debt levels benefit from better access 
to financial markets and have more room for 
short-term stabilisation policies to smooth 
the impact of shocks. Thus, fiscal prudence 
in good times is an important factor in 
economic resilience. Moreover, as the recent 
crisis has demonstrated, spillover effects 
between individual countries and the rest of 
the Union also imply that resilience needs 
to be addressed in a coordinated manner 
at EU level. Economic decisions related 
to individual Member States need to be 
evaluated taking into account the interplay 
with all the other countries. In addition, 
the commitment of each individual state 
matters a lot for the proper functioning of 
the EU as a whole.
According to the rules set out in the 
Stability and Growth Pact, EU Member 
States must keep their government 
deficit and total government debt within 
specified limits, namely 3 % and 60 % 
of GDP, to ensure sound and sustainable 
public finances. Economic and fiscal 
governance in the EU and the euro area 
has been fundamentally strengthened 
with the ‘six-pack’, the ‘two-pack’ and 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG) 50. This strengthened 
framework aims to detect, prevent and 
correct problematic economic trends, such 
as excessive government deficits or public 
debt levels, which can stunt growth and put 
economies or the whole EU at risk, if not 
corrected. According to the strengthened 
Stability and Growth Pact 51, Member 
States’ budgetary balance will converge 
towards the country-specific medium-term 
objective. This medium-term objective 
takes into account the economic cycle and 
excludes the impact of one-off measures. 
The underlying logic is that Member States 
should achieve and maintain a budgetary 
position that will allow automatic stabilisers 
to play their full role in mitigating possible 
economic shocks.
An essential ingredient for monitoring 
and enforcing convergence towards the 
medium-term objective is the estimation 
of potential output (or GDP) and the 
output gap. Potential output growth 
constitutes a summary indicator of the 
economy’s fundamentals whilst the output 
gap is the difference between actual 
and potential output and provides an 
indication of the degree of overheating or 
48 -  Economic and Monetary Union: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi-
nance/euro/emu/index_en.htm
49 -  Canova, F., Coutinho, L., Kontol-
emis, Z., ‘Measuring the macro-
economic resilience of industrial 
sectors in the EU and assess-
ing the role of product market 
regulations’, European Economy, 
Occasional Papers no. 112, Euro-
pean Commission, 2012
50 -  Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (TSCG): http://
w w w . c o n s i l i u m . e u r o p a . e u /
european-council /pdf/ Treaty-
on-Stability-Coordination-and-
Governance-TSCG/. See also EU 
economic governance: http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
economic_governance/ index_
en.htm
51 -  Stability and Growth Pact: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi-
nance/economic_governance/
sgp/index_en.htm
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slack relative to this growth potential. 
Measuring potential growth provides 
a fundamental element of flexibility 
in the Stability and Growth Pact, by 
accounting for temporary or cyclical 
adverse shocks hitting economies. 
This coordinated framework at EU level 
contributes to developing resilience: 
commitment about fiscal discipline 
is addressed by balancing central 
agreement and local flexibility.
Potential output cannot be directly 
observed and needs to be estimated 
by statistical/econometric methods This 
sensitive and possibly controversial 
element requires a robust and sound 
methodological framework. The Euro- 
pean Commission monitors convergence 
towards the medium-term objective 
by applying a methodology that is 
commonly agreed between the Member 
States 52. The JRC is contributing to this 
fiscal surveillance exercise with the 
development and continuous upgrade 
of Program GAP 53, the ‘official’ software 
platform used by policy-makers and 
Member States to estimate potential 
output and the output gap. This commonly 
agreed methodology is another indicator 
of resilience: if each EU Member State 
calculated potential growth in a different 
way, economic governance would be much 
less efficient and more prone to discre-
tionary fiscal policy decisions.
In addition, this demonstrates how 
enforcing and monitoring general 
commitments within the framework 
of economic resilience also requires a 
sound and robust methodological and 
scientific contribution. It is clear, too, that 
the ‘European hat’ plays a key role in 
ensuring equal treatment and consensus 
regarding the implementation of the 
common rules.
The Stability and Growth Pact and its 
recently reformed framework have 
proven effective in coordinating EU 
Member States’ efforts to consolidate 
public finances in difficult economic 
conditions. Recent experience suggests 
that the reformed EU fiscal rules have 
indeed played a role in achieving 
progress as regards fiscal consolidation. 
In the EU-28, the average fiscal deficit 
has been falling and many countries have 
exited the Excessive Deficit Procedure 54. 
Moreover, macroeconomic imbalances 
are being corrected. The commitment to 
sound and sustainable public finances 
is a commitment to ensuring economic 
growth and employment in the longer 
term, and to developing the resilience of 
the European economy as a whole.
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52 -  Havik, K., Mc Morrow, K., Orlandi, 
F., Planas, C., Raciborski, R., 
Röger, W., Rossi, A., Thum-Thy-
sen, A., Vandermeulen, V., ‘The 
Production Function Methodol-
ogy for Calculating Potential 
Growth Rates & Output Gaps’, 
European Economy, Economic 
Papers no. 535, European Com-
mission, 2014
53 -  GAP:   https: //ec .europa.eu/jrc /
en/research-topic /monitoring-
fiscal-imbalances
54 -  Excessive Deficit Procedure: 
ht tp : //ec .europa .eu /eurostat /
web/government-finance-statis-
tics/excessive-deficit-procedure
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Health and pandemics: 
efficient EU responses 
by sharing knowledge
C. Nicholl 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Epidemic and pandemic outbreaks of 
communicable diseases test the resilience 
of health systems as well as health 
threat risk assessment, preparedness and 
response structures worldwide. Examples 
such as the Ebola virus disease in West 
Africa in 2014, the Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus in 2012, the E.coli 
outbreak in 2011, the H1N1 influenza 
pandemic in 2009, the H5N1 avian influenza 
pandemic in 2004 and the outbreak of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
in 2003 have all illustrated how quickly 
diseases can spread across borders, due in 
part to the global transport of people and 
goods. These outbreaks put an additional 
strain on health systems that already need 
to deal with a rise in chronic diseases and 
ageing populations and the subsequent 
increase in healthcare costs.
In the EU, the main responsibility for health 
policy and the provision of healthcare to 
European citizens lies with the Member 
States. The European Commission plays an 
important role in areas where the Member 
States cannot effectively act alone and 
where cooperative action (EU added value) 
at community level is indispensable 55, 56, 57. 
Stronger cooperation on health technology 
assessment within the respective EU net- 
work established under Directive 2011/24 58, 
further development of information flows 
in the Member States’ health systems, the 
establishment of an integrated EU health 
information system, and stronger coopera-
tion between EU Member States on eHealth 
(facilitated by the European eHealth 
network and the 2012-2020 eHealth action 
plan 59) are needed.
Furthermore, as regards health emergen-
cies, the European Commission’s Decision 60 
of 2013 on serious cross-border threats 
to health strengthens the EU’s planning 
capacity preparedness, improves risk 
assessment and management of cross-
border health threats, allows for the 
development and implementation of a 
joint procurement of medical counter-
measures and enhances the coordination 
of response at EU level. Risk assessment 
is carried out by specialised EU agencies: 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control 61 (founded in 2004 in the 
aftermath of the SARS outbreak) identifies, 
assesses and communicates current and 
emerging threats to human health posed by 
communicable diseases, and the European 
Food Safety Authority 62 (founded in 2002) 
provides scientific advice and communi-
cation on risks associated with the food 
chain, ensuring a high level of consumer 
protection and maintaining confidence 
in food and feed safety. Alert systems 
have been established to facilitate 
cooperation and coordination between the 
EU Member States, the EU agencies and 
the European Commission.
The 2014 outbreak of the Ebola virus disease 
in the West-African region is an example of 
an epidemic that put enormous stress on the 
health systems in the countries most badly 
affected (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), 
claimed many lives, and had a negative 
impact on economies, the provision of food 
and development within the region.
The threat of a global health crisis 
triggered international actions which 
55 -  ‘Building resilient and innova-
tive health systems’, EURO-
HEALTH, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013, 
European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies, 
Brussels, Belgium: http://www.
euro .who . in t /_ _data /asset s /
pdf_f ile /0006/216843/Euro-
health_v19-n3.pdf
56 -  ‘White Paper - Together for 
Health: A Strategic Approach for 
the EU 2008-2013, COM(2007) 
630 final: http://eur-lex.eu-
r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N /
TXT/?uri=celex:52007DC0630
57 -  ‘COM(2014) 215 final, on ‘ef-
fective, accessible and resilient 
health systems’,: http://eur-lex.
europa .eu / legal-content /EN /
TXT/?uri=COM:2014:0215:FIN
58 -  ‘Directive 2011/24/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare, OJ L 
88/45, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ
:L:2011:088:0045:0065:en:PDF
59 -  ‘eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020 
- Innovative healthcare for the 
21st century, COM(2012) 736 
final: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.o?uri=CO
M:2012:0736:FIN:EN:PDF
60 -  Decision No 1082/2013/EU of 
the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 October 2013 
on serious cross-border threats 
to health, and repealing Deci-
sion No 2119/98/EC, OJ L 293/1: 
h t t p : / / e c . eu r op a . eu / hea l t h /
preparedness_response/docs/
decision_serious_crossborder_
threats_22102013_en.pdf
61 -  European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC): 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/Pages/
home.aspx
62 -  European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA): http://www.efsa.europa.
eu/
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were eventually able to contain the 
disease. The EU set up a dedicated task 
force which contributed to the contain- 
ment of Ebola via the coordination of 
Member States’ efforts. Web-based 
media monitoring tools were used for 
surveillance during the crisis 63. The 
world’s major health organisations are 
still evaluating the lessons to be learned 
and how to cope with similar outbreaks 
in the future. Important key elements 
have been identified, such as an adequate 
number of trained health workers, 
the availability of medicines, robust 
health information systems including 
surveillance, appropriate infrastructure, 
global investment in research and 
development for medical products, 
sufficient public financing and a strong 
public sector to deliver equitable services 
of high quality.
In addition to the health shocks related 
to communicable diseases, long-term 
stresses, such as rising obesity rates in 
both developed and emerging countries, 
have taken on a huge dimension. Over 1.5 
billion people worldwide are overweight 
or obese while more than 40 million chil- 
dren under the age of five are overweight.
The health and economic burdens (US$ 
2 trillion annually worldwide or 2.8 % of 
global GDP56) are testing the resilience 
of our health systems. In Europe, in 
2010, one in three 6-9-year-olds were 
overweight and/or obese, marking an 
increase of more than 30 % compared 
to 2008. The European level also adds 
resilience and value to countering these 
long-term trends.
The European Commission has estab-
lished a coherent and comprehensive 
community strategy to address the 
issues of overweight and obesity and 
set up a High Level Group on Nutrition 
and Physical Activity 64 to facilitate the 
sharing of policy ideas and practice. This 
group recognises that the fight against the 
obesity epidemic 65 requires a special focus 
on childhood obesity and has therefore 
designed an EU action plan on childhood 
obesity for the period 2014-2020. This 
approach is also underpinned by scientific 
work: in 2014, the JRC conducted a school-
based study on physical activity, mapped 
EU school food policies 66, and published 
a foresight study on tomorrow’s healthy 
society, indicating research priorities for 
foods and diets 67. 
63 -  Barboza, J., Vaillant, L., Le 
Strat, Y., Hartley, D. M., Nelson, 
N. P., Mawudeku, A., Madoff, L. 
C., Linge, P., Collier, N., Brown-
stein, J. S., Astagneau, P., ‘Fac-
tors influencing performance of 
internet-based biosurveillance 
systems used in epidemic intel-
ligence for early detection of 
infectious diseases outbreaks’, 
PLOS One, 9(3):e90536, 2014: 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
a r t i c l e ? id=10 .1371 / jou r na l .
pone.0090536
64 -  A Strategy for Europe on Nu-
trition, Overweight and Obe-
sity related health issues, 
COM(2007)279 final:  
ht tp : //eur- lex .europa .eu /Lex-
UriServ/LexUriServ. 
65 -  High Level Group on Nutrition 
and Physical Activity:  
http: //ec .europa.eu/health/nu-
trition_physical_activity/high_
level_group/index_en.htm
66 -  Storcksdiek gennant Bonsmann, 
S., Breda, J., Caldeira, S., Nelson, 
M., Wollgast, J., School Food and 
Nutrition in Europe: policies, 
interventions and their impact, 
European Commission, 2014. 
ISBN 978-92-97-39657-1:  
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.
e u / r e p o s i t o r y / b i t s t r e a m /
JRC91433/school%20food%20
po l i c y % 20 wor k shop % 20re -
port%20%28online%29.pdf
67 -  Bock, A.-K., Maragkoudakis, P., 
Wollgast, J., Caldeira, S., Czim-
balmos, A., Rzychon, M., At-
zel, B., Ulberth, F., Tomorrow’s 
Healthy Society - Research Pri-
orities for Foods and Diets, Eu-
ropean Commission, 2014, ISBN 
978-92-79-40070-4: https://
ec .europa.eu/jrc /sites/default /
f i l e s / j r c - s t u d y - t o m o r r o w -
healthly-society.pdfdo?uri=COM
:2007:0279:FIN:EN:PDF
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Social resilience
G. Fischer
European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion
Resilience is the ability to adjust easily to 
or cope with internal changes or external 
shocks. The economic resilience of the EU 
as a whole, and all individual Member 
States, should be strengthened by the 
fundamentals of the Common Market 
underpinning it: the ‘mobility’ factor, 
guaranteed by the four freedoms – free 
movement of goods, services, capital and 
people – makes the EU’s economy more 
efficient and better able to reallocate 
resources effectively in the face of changing 
circumstances. Economic resilience should 
translate very closely to social resilience 
as societies use growing wealth to ensure 
high employment and socially inclusive 
outcomes; the mobility factor should 
help all members to cope better with 
large economic shocks. But if insufficient 
attention is paid to ‘how the benefits of 
growth are shared’, rising wealth can 
actually reduce resilience in the long run. 
The use of growing wealth to increase 
social resilience is not an automatic process. 
The EU treaties show that the EU is intended 
to be not just an economic entity but also 
a Union of common values and social 
objectives, and addressing social resilience 
is a legitimate instantiation of those 
common values and objectives. Indeed, 
certain types of EU instruments are specif-
ically designed to promote social resilience. 
Employment and social standards, enacted 
to ensure a competitive level playing field, 
are an evident example. Rules on occupa-
tional safety and health lead to a healthier 
and more productive workforce better able 
to do new jobs as old ones are phased out 
by new technology or global competition.
Information and consultation obligations, 
and the general commitment to social 
dialogue, can reinforce the capacity of 
both the economic actors and the Member 
States to adjust in a socially balanced 
manner, further strengthening resilience. 
Social benchmarks enable Member States 
to enact policies enhancing their resilience. 
The EU’s Youth Guarantee requires all 
countries to ensure that any young person 
is offered a job or a place in education 
or training within four months of leaving 
school or becoming unemployed. It is 
designed to ensure that the young are better 
equipped to adjust to the huge changes 
that the crisis brought about, to cope with 
the lack of jobs in many countries still 
rebalancing, and to have the skills for when 
recovery brings new jobs.
To ensure free movement of all workers, 
the EU has several legislative rules in 
place. These rules prohibit discrimination 
against workers from another Member 
State and cover social security payments 
to non-nationals or to nationals in another 
Member State. There are also many 
non-legislative initiatives to overcome 
the barriers to mobility. The Erasmus 
programme 68 financing student exchanges 
and the EURES programme 69 facilitating 
job search in other Member States are 
two such actions.
The EU’s social Structural Funds enhance 
resilience by investing in people, preparing 
them for change or to confront shocks as 
they happen. The European Social Fund 70 
(ESF)’s EUR 80 billion for the seven years 
(2014 20) are targeted to help poorer 
68 -  Erasmus+ programme: http://
eacea .ec .europa .eu/erasmus-
plus_en
69 -  EURES: https://ec.europa.eu/eu-
res/public/en/homepage
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countries, or poorer regions and vulnerable 
groups in richer ones, and to reinforce 
their resilience. ESF funding pays for 
upgrading the skills of millions of workers, 
as well as active labour market meas- 
ures for the unemployed. The European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 71 
finances retraining for workers made 
redundant by global changes.
The decade before 2007-8 had seen 
growing convergence of employment and 
social performance outcomes, but the 
crisis set off strongly divergent trends. 
The more socially resilient Member States 
quickly returned to good performance 
in terms of jobs and social inclusion. 
However, others are still today below their 
pre-crisis performance levels, and EU 
membership is less obviously a source 
of resilience for them. The European 
Semester, backed up by legislation 
ensuring public debt and deficit limits for 
members of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) 72, seeks to maximise the 
conditions for economic, employment 
and social resilience in each country.
Every year, a number of country-specific 
social recommendations are addressed 
to most if not all Member States. 
However, social resilience requires 
continued adaptation to the changing 
situations. While structural reforms are 
key to improving social resilience, the 
workings of the EMU with a single 
currency and single interest rate but very 
different institutional settings in different 
Member States may mean that the 
mobility factor could actually exacerbate 
rather than temper divergent forces and 
weaken resilience in those already more 
fragile countries. A much discussed 
option to temper this, a common 
Union-level fiscal capacity with automatic 
stabilising functions, is a ‘European 
unemployment benefit mechanism’. 
There is a wide variety of models for such 
a system but clearly it could in the long 
run be a major force for social resilience 
in individual countries, the euro area and 
the EU as a whole.
Being in a Union has created the 
capability for the Member States to 
initiate and develop together measures 
that actively promote convergence and 
thereby strengthen social resilience 
across the entire Union.
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70 -  European Social Fund (ESF): 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=325
71 -  European Globalisation Ad-
justment Fund (EGF): http://
e c . e u r o p a . e u / s o c i a l / m a i n .
jsp?catId=326
72 -  Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (EMU): http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/euro/emu/in-
dex_en.htm
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Geopolitics: 
common platforms 
for efficient EU crisis 
response
D. Al Khudhairy
European Commission, Joint Research Centre 
Since the last two world wars, the EU 
has been a beacon for peace, security 
and prosperity. Successful enlargements 
have increased the Union’s international 
weight and established it as the largest 
integrated economic area in the world, 
with strengthened democracy, stability, 
security and human rights in its own 
territory. In its vital interest to address 
risks and crises outside its borders, the 
EU has developed and now deploys a wide 
array of policies, tools and instruments, 
spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, 
financial, trade, development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid fields 73. Together, 
their external impact and those of interna-
tional obligations on EU policy-making 
have led to the EU being considered as an 
influential global actor 74.
However, the Council conclusions on 
Common Security and Defence Policy in 
2014 75 identified ongoing conflicts and 
instability in the Union’s neighbourhood, 
from Iraq and Syria to the Ukraine, as a 
cause for great concern that is threatening 
the Union’s security and which may 
have longer-term effects on interna-
tional peace and stability. Furthermore, 
the recent terror attacks in Europe and 
growing regional instability near Europe’s 
borders and consequential migration 
have brought home the geopolitical 
circumstances of these external crises 
and instabilities.
This complex geopolitical environment 
makes it difficult to draw distinct lines 
between security and defence, or 
between internal and external security. 
This has created a momentum for the 
further integration of the Union’s external 
action instruments and linking them with 
its internal policies 76. The President of 
the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, stated repeatedly that Europe 
has to do more to get its act together, 
to better manage migration and to 
enhance its foreign and security policy 77. 
He also underlined the importance of a 
more united and influential Union on the 
international stage by making this one of 
his 10 political priorities. Achieving this not 
only depends on deploying all of the EU’s 
actions at national and European level, 
but it also requires the EU and its Member 
States to combine their efforts and to 
work with the EU’s strategic partners, 
including the United Nations and the 
African Union. 
In this regard, the EU is making progress 
through its comprehensive approach 
combining its relevant internal and exter- 
nal action instruments. The EU Maritime 
Security Strategy 78 is considered to 
be the first integrated strategy of this 
approach, bringing together internal 
and external security issues as well as 
civilian and military maritime concerns. 
The EU plans to extend its compre-
hensive approach to further strengthen 
the linkages between the internal and 
external dimension of migration policy. 
Another example is the EU’s compre-
hensive approach to external conflict 
and crises, which has defined a concrete 
set of actions for implementation by 
the Commission, the European External 
Action Service and EU Member States 79, 80. 
73 -  Bomberg, E., Peterson, J., Cor-
bett, R. (Eds.), The European 
Union – How does it work?, 3rd 
Edition, Oxford University Press 
Inc., New York, 2012
74 -  Wallace, H., Pollack, M. A., 
Young, A. R. (Eds.), Policy-Mak-
ing in the European Union, 7th 
Edition Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2015
75 -  ht tp : //www.consil ium.europa .
e u / u e d o c s / c m s _ d a t a /d o c s /
pressdata /EN/foraff/145824.
pdf
76 -  Council conclusions on the EU’s 
comprehensive approach: http://
www.consil ium.europa .eu/ue-
docs/cms_Data/docs/pressda-
ta/EN/foraff/142552.pdf
77 -  The European Security and De-
fence Union, Volume No. 20, Pro-
Press GmbH, Bonn, 2015
78 -  European Union Maritime Se-
curity Strategy, as adopted by 
the Council on 24 June 2014: 
http://register.consilium.europa.
e u /d o c / s r v? l= E N & f= S T % 2 0
11205%202014%20INIT
79 -  Joint Staff Working Document, 
‘Taking forward the EU’s Com-
prehensive Approach to exter-
nal conflict and crises - Action 
Plan 2015’, SWD(2015) 85 final: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document /ST-7913-2015-
INIT/en/pdf
80 -  Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and 
the Council, ‘The EU’s com-
prehensive approach to ex-
ternal conflict and crises’, 
JOIN(2013) 30 final: http://www.
eeas .europa .eu /s tatement s /
docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf
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The EU’s comprehensive approach 
recognises that enabling the Union to 
confront geopolitical uncertainties also 
necessitates operational actions and 
capabilities. 
These include developing more 
structured information sharing 
and shared situational awareness, 
application of existing and new EU 
early-warning systems, and more 
joined-up analysis across all relevant 
domains of EU internal and external 
actions. The EU’s Integrated Political 
Crisis Response platform 81, for example, 
enhances cooperation, information 
sharing and analysis by linking up the 
situational awareness and emergency 
management centres of the Union, EU 
agencies and the Member States. The 
EU Crisis Platform 82 and the Emergency 
Response Coordination Centre 83 provide 
the means for coordinated EU crisis 
preparedness and response.
Needless to say, a stronger impact of 
the EU’s external action goes hand-in-
hand with more coherence in internal 
security issues within the Union. The 
Stockholm Programme 84 and the Lisbon 
Treaty 85 both provide the opportunity 
for strengthening EU competence in 
internal security areas, with the political 
framework being updated when required.
In 2015, the EU High Representative 
and Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Federica Mogherini, launched 
a strategic review to assess the impact 
of changes in the global environment to 
guide the EU’s new Foreign and Security 
Strategy 86. The new strategy for mid-2016 
is expected to bring EU institutions and 
Member States even closer together to 
strengthen the EU’s resilience through 
addressing the challenges of a world that 
is more connected, more complex and 
more contested than at the time of the 
2003 European Security Strategy. 81 -  Council of the European Union, 
General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil, Integrated Political Crisis 
Response (IPCR) Web Platform, 
European Union, Brussels, 2013, 
ISBN: 978-92-824-3973-9 
http: //bookshop.europa.eu/en/
the-eu- integrated-pol i t ica l-
crisis-response-arrangements-
in-brief-pbQC0313314/
82 -  EU Crisis Platform: http://www.
eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/
what-we-do/crisis-platform/in-
dex_en.htm
83 -  Emergency Response Coordina-
tion Centre: http://ec.europa.
eu/echo/what /civil-protection/
emergency-response-coordina-
tion-centre-ercc_en
84 -  Stockholm Programme – An 
open and secure Europe serv-
ing and protecting the citizens, 
2 December 2009, 17024/09: 
ht tp : //ec .europa .eu/ant i-traf-
ficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/
the_stockholm_programme_-_
an_open_and_secure_europe_
en_0.pdf
85 -  Lisbon Treaty: Treaty of Lisbon 
amending the Treaty on Europe-
an Union and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, 
signed at Lisbon, 13 December 
2007, C 306/1: http://eur-lex.
europa .eu / legal-content /EN /
TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT
86 -  European Security Strategy: 
h t t p : / / w w w.eeas .europa .eu /
csdp/about-csdp/european-se-
curity-strategy/
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Climate change: 
how to address 
a creeping crisis
M. Porter
European Climate Foundation
Given the pervasive, multifaceted and 
significant nature of the effects of climate 
change, not just on our environment but 
also on our economies and societies, the 
challenge of developing resilience to it is 
clearly one of the most urgent, complex and 
central ones for the world as a whole.
This is not the place to repeat the 
overwhelming scientific evidence of the 
effects already now happening or on 
those effects we can expect in the years 
and decades ahead – those have been 
abundantly well explored and set out by 
the UN’s work in particular. Adaptation 
strategies, such as the one adopted by 
the European Commission in 2013 87, 
are fundamentally resilience strategies, 
designed to help us cope with a world that, 
will be in all probability at least 2 degrees 
warmer on average than pre-industrial 
times. And we should remember that even 
limiting temperature increase to this is still 
only judged to give us a 50-50 chance of 
avoiding dangerous impacts, so the need 
to ‘prepare for the worst’ is unfortunately 
already necessary, too.
From a European perspective, it is clear that 
whilst these resilience-building activities 
need to be pursued at various levels of 
government, with local, regional, city and 
national activities all important, and with 
considerable private-sector involvement as 
well as that of civil society, the role of the EU 
is an important integral part of an effective 
overall strategy. In helping to coordinate, 
build and share knowledge, address specific 
cross-border environmental impacts and 
future-proof EU policies related, for example, 
to infrastructure development, agriculture, 
or disaster planning and crisis response, the 
Union’s role is an indispensable one.
In light not just of the anticipated further 
impacts, but also of the lack of sufficient 
progress to date, the need for this role 
which will only grow over coming years. 
Recent studies of the European private 
sector 88 demonstrate that although climate 
change is already impacting businesses and 
changing risk profiles and decision choices 
for activities ranging from infrastructure 
investment and location, capital market 
access, supply chain management, employee 
engagement and corporate reputation, 
responses to this vary widely and depend on 
many factors. And they are still inadequate 
to address the urgency let alone the severity 
of the changes anticipated. The EU’s role in 
encouraging greater attention to this falls 
squarely within its adaption strategy but 
importantly, only covers resilience through 
adapting to the problem itself.
Equally important is the need to understand 
and exploit opportunities arising from 
needing to solve the underlying problem. 
The undoubted severity of the impacts 
that lie ahead, and our ability to develop 
resilience to them, also requires resilience 
from our ability to tackle the causes of 
climate change, namely the pattern of 
production and consumption that leads to 
emissions of so-called greenhouse gases, 
notably carbon dioxide, released when we 
burn fossil fuels.
The transition to a low- and ultimately 
no-carbon economy that is necessary for 
87 -  COM(2013) 216 final, ‘An EU 
Strategy on adaptation to cli-
mate change’: http://ec.europa.
eu/cl ima /polic ies/adaptat ion/
what /docs /com _ 2013_ 216 _
en.pdf
88 -  Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
Climate Change Resilience in Eu-
rope – A Snapshot of the Private 
Sector, CDP, London, 2014: htt-
ps: //www.cdp.net /CDPResults/
climate-change-resilience-eu-
rope.pdf 
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us to deal with the likely effects of even 
‘only’ a two-degree increase in average 
global temperatures is as fundamental a 
part of our developing resilience to climate 
change as the need for our societies 
to adapt and develop resilience to the 
impacts of changes we have already 
set in motion. And whilst we are rightly 
concerned with avoiding certain environ-
mental thresholds or ‘tipping points’, 
there are conversely such thresholds 
that we need to cross in order to see the 
transformational and rapid change in 
our economies that will lead to resilience 
from decarbonisation. And there are 
some positive signs here, for example, 
in the now incredibly rapid penetration 
of renewables and ‘post-Fukushima’ 
politics that have developed so quickly in 
Germany, in particular.
Indeed, it is in the energy area that the 
case for an EU-level strategy is clearest 
from a resilience perspective. The recent 
‘Energy Union’ 89 initiative from the 
European Commission represents perhaps 
the clearest contemporary example of an 
area where greater integration amongst 
EU countries will increase resilience. In 
a highly interdependent, interconnected 
environment, Europe’s energy grid and 
market still remain largely fragmented 
along national lines – even though 
resilience to shocks from dependence on 
imported fuel or the balancing necessary 
from greatly increased use of renewable 
energy across the EU would be clearly 
enhanced by greater integration – a goal 
at the heart of the Energy Union.
In other areas of economic activity, rather 
than dealing with the potential negative 
impacts of climate change, resilience will 
also be achieved through anticipating 
and exploiting the potential competitive 
advantages of leading the industrial and 
technological innovation as we rapidly 
transition to a new climate economy. 
These various climate-resilience 
benefits of a more integrated system 
of co-operation within Europe are 
ones that its Member States must 
balance against familiar reliance on 
national systems aiming at the same 
objectives. But with innovation at the 
core of the transition to a new, climate-
resilient economy and society, the 
need for change in the governance of 
such common problems is clear – and 
possibly a defining one for the EU in 
coming decades.
89 -  COM(2015) 80 final, ‘A Frame-
work Strategy for a Resilient 
Energy Union and a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy’: 
http: //eur-lex .europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CEL
EX:52015DC0080&from=EN
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Migration: 
European cooperation 
for resilience 
of  the blue borders  
A. Zampieri 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
The free flow of people, goods and capital 
within the EU has stimulated its economy 
immensely. The Schengen Area 90 in 
particular allows the free circulation of 
people without checks at the internal 
borders; as a consequence, Schengen states 
have to tighten controls at their common 
external borders to ensure security inside 
the area. External borders are expected 
to stop the entrance of illegal or unsafe 
goods, protect against unfair competition, 
and prevent unchecked immigration. 
One way to enter the EU unseen is by 
sea: seaborne migration to the EU’s 
southern shores has become a major issue, 
making tragic headlines with too many 
lives being lost at sea. Wars, instability 
and bad economic conditions in the EU’s 
neighbourhood have been inducing people 
to seek a safe haven and prosperity in 
Europe. But while the EU is trying to define 
an improved policy with its European 
Agenda on Migration 91, criminal organi-
sations are sabotaging it, making migrants 
cross the sea in unseaworthy vessels. 
This is a huge and increasing challenge 
for Europe, which is calling for enhanced 
resilience through a rapid response and 
intervention capacity both at the political 
and technical level.
Part of this response lies in better 
monitoring of the European southern 
maritime borders. Vessels hoping to reach 
EU shores undetected or unsafe boats 
carrying migrants must be identified at an 
early stage, although this is not an easy 
task. In the first place, they are small 
objects in a vast sea. Searching wide 
areas of sea requires significant capacity 
from maritime surveillance aircraft or patrol 
boats, which are both very costly options. 
Secondly, the European seas are quite busy 
and most of the traffic is legal. The question 
is, how can one small boat with illegal 
cargo be distinguished from hundreds of 
similar vessels? The decision to single out a 
particular ship for further inspection, or to 
approach it for rescue operations, must be 
based on information on the target – from 
observations, analysis of its behaviour, 
tracing it back to its point of departure, 
etc. This requires powerful sensors, plus 
the integration of information from many 
sources and analytic capacity. Thirdly, 
perpetrators need to be apprehended 
and brought to justice, which requires 
the appropriate means and procedures 
for gathering and securing evidence. There 
is also a need to identify migrants, who 
are often paperless.
Europe as a whole is more resilient than 
individual countries to respond to many of 
these challenges. By pooling patrol boats 
and aircraft from individual Member States, 
such assets can be targeted at areas 
where, and during periods when pressure 
is highest, thus focusing surveillance 
capacity where it is most needed. This is 
already being achieved in joint operations 
organised by the EU’s external borders 
Agency Frontex 92. It is one aspect of the 
European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR) 93, which came into operation 
in 2013 to reinforce control of Europe’s 
external borders. Another aspect EUROSUR 
looks at is the exchange of information 
between all EU border authorities (land and 
90 -  Schengen Area: http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/
schengen/index_en.htm
91 -  COM(2015) 240, final, ‘A Eu-
ropean Agenda on Migration’, 
http: //ec .europa.eu/dgs/home-
affair s /what-we-do/pol ic ies /
european-agenda-migrat ion /
background-information/docs/
communication_on_the_euro-
pean_agenda_on_migration_
en.pdf
92 -  Frontex, European Agency for 
the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Bor-
ders of the Member States of 
the European Union: http://fron-
tex.europa.eu/
93 -  European external border sur-
veillance system (EUROSUR): 
ht tp : / /europa .eu / legislat ion_
summaries/ just ice_freedom_
secur ity/free_movement_of_
persons_asylum_immigration/
l14579_en.htm and http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0068
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sea), making information available where 
it is needed. EUROSUR also considers 
common surveillance tools, like satellites, 
which would be too expensive for one single 
country to operate but can be afforded by 
the EU as a whole. Of even wider scope 
is the Common Information Sharing 
Environment (CISE) 94 for the surveillance 
of the EU maritime domain, intended to 
achieve effective data exchange between 
all maritime authorities across sectors 
and borders. By 2020, this EU initiative 
will enable about 400 maritime adminis-
trations to exchange maritime surveillance 
informa-tion in order to increase efficiency 
and improve decision-making concerning 
actions at sea. Furthermore, the EU has 
its flagship programme ‘Copernicus’ 95 for 
Earth observation, which is being used 
for security and maritime surveillance 
applications, while EU -wide information 
systems such as the Schengen Informa- 
tion System enable Member States to 
properly manage requests for entry into 
or stay in the Schengen Area. Finally, 
enhanced collaboration between civil and 
military authorities is being put in place, 
significantly augmenting the EU response 
at a lower cost.
In spite of all these EU efforts, the flow 
of migrants across its ‘blue border’ 
continues, which calls for further 
enhanced and cost-efficient surveillance; 
R&D is part of the answer. The EU’s 
Horizon 2020 programme 96 – which also 
includes the JRC – funds and pools R&D 
efforts, including border surveillance. 
It helps EU industry to improve products 
for operational use, including sensors, 
platforms, data processing and analysis 
methods. It leverages national and indus- 
trial R&D budgets, avoiding unneces- 
sary duplication of development efforts 
through cooperation. Current technical 
issues concerning maritime surveillance 
that are challenges for R&D include 
the detection of small boats, authen-
tication of reported ship positions, 
persistent surveillance, and unam- 
biguous identification through biometrics. 
Improved civil-military interaction to 
avoid duplications in areas where R&D 
requirements overlap is another aspect 
receiving attention.
The recently adopted European Agenda 
on Migration shows how to better manage 
migration and, in turn, to enhance EU 
resilience. Operational authorities, policy-
makers and the scientific community, 
including the JRC, are joining forces to 
achieve this ambitious EU objective.
94 -  Common Information Shar-
ing Environment (CISE): http://
ec .europa.eu/dgs/marit imeaf-
fairs_f isheries/consultations/
cise/index_en.htm
95 -  Copernicus, European Pro-
gramme for the establishment 
of a European capacity for Earth 
Observation: http://www.coper-
nicus.eu/
96 -  Horizon 2020, The EU Frame-
work Programme for Research 
and Innovation: https://ec. 
europa .eu /programmes/hor i-
zon2020/
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Counter-terrorism:  
EU collaboration 
O. Luyckx
European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in 
Europe. It poses a threat to our security, to 
the values of our democratic societies, and 
to the rights and freedoms of European 
citizens. While national security remains 
the responsibility of Member States, 
the phenomenon of terrorism must be 
confronted at both a national and interna-
tional level since it does not recognise 
borders. When designing measures to build 
resilience against terrorism, a compre-
hensive approach is needed to maintain the 
security of citizens in Europe in accordance 
with fundamental rights. Building EU 
resilience against terrorism aims to combat 
terrorism globally while respecting human 
rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing 
its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice.
Addressing the threat of terrorism
The fight against terrorism is principally a 
matter for national authorities. Nevertheless, 
the EU Member States are committed to 
jointly fighting terrorism and providing the 
best possible protection for its citizens. In this 
context, concerted and collective EU-level 
action is indispensable. Therefore, the Council 
has adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy 97 in 2005 and The European 
Agenda on Security for 2015–2020 98 was 
adopted on 26 April 2015.
Countering terrorism at EU level is focused 
on four main pillars: prevent, protect, 
pursue and respond. EU actions aim at 
strengthening national as well as collective 
capabilities and enhancing cooperation, 
supporting EU Member States in carefully 
targeted actions and initiatives. The EU 
mechanisms are based on the knowledge 
that the terrorist threat can most effectively 
be countered through the extensive use of 
cooperation and partnerships. 
•  The establishment and application of a 
robust risk assessment methodology 
is a fundamental requirement for the 
effective management of security risks 
supporting the decision-making process 
and ensuring a better informed allocation 
of resources.
•  Under prevent, the EU aims to prevent 
people from being radicalised and 
recruited for terrorist purposes. To address 
this issue, the Commission has launched 
an EU-wide Radicalisation Awareness 
Network 99 programme which aims at 
connecting practitioners and front-liners 
from across the EU to give them the 
opportunity to exchange information and 
best practice, and equip them with the 
skills and expertise to deal with those 
who have been radicalised or are at risk.
•  On protect, the European Commission has 
developed different proactive initiatives, 
e.g. in countering terrorist financing and 
hindering access to explosives and to 
chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear materials. The Commission 
is also responsible for the European 
Programme for the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure 100 and the EU-US 
Agreement on Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Programme 101.
•  The solidarity clause in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 102 
introduces a legal obligation on the EU 
and its States to assist each other when 
97 -  EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy: 
ht tp : //register.consil ium.eu-
ropa.eu/doc/N&f=ST+14469+ 
2005+REV+4
98 -  The European Agenda on Se-
curity for 2015-2020: http://
e c . e u r o p a . e u / d g s / h o m e -
affairs/e-library/documents/
bas ic- document s /doc s /eu _
agenda_on_security_en.pdf
99 -  Radicalisation Awareness Net-
work (RAN): http://ec.europa.
eu /dgs /home-affa ir s /what-
we-do/networks /radica l isa-
tion_awareness_network / in-
dex_en.htm
100 -  European Programme for Criti-
cal Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP): http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
policies/crisis-and-terrorism/
critical-infrastructure/index_
en.htm
101 -  EU-US Agreement on the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Programme:   h t t p : / /eur- lex .
e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t /
E N / T X T / ? u r i = C E L E X : 2 2 01
0A0113%2801%29
102 -  Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union: http://eur-
lex .europa .eu/ legal-content /
EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT
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an EU Member State is the object 
either of a terrorist attack or a natural 
or man-made disaster. In recent 
years, different crisis coordination 
mechanisms have been set up to 
enhance the EU’s crisis management 
capacity. At European Commission 
level, the ARGUS 103 general rapid alert 
system has been created to better 
coordinate the Commission’s response 
capacity. ARGUS brings together all 
relevant Commission services to 
coordinate efforts, evaluate the best 
options for action, and decide on the 
appropriate response measures during 
an emergency.
Outlook
The threat from terrorism in Europe 
remains strong, manifesting itself in 
various forms and driven by diverse 
motives. The EU’s increasingly open 
area of free movement could be abused 
by terrorists to pursue their objectives. 
Foreign terrorist fighters from Europe 
travelling to different locations to fight 
jihad, and the security threat they may 
pose inside the EU when they return, 
are also likely to persist in the coming 
years. This phenomenon adds a new 
dimension to the existing threat situation 
in the EU, since it provides new groups 
within Member States with both terrorist 
intentions and capabilities, which may 
result in terrorist attacks with unexpected 
targets and timings.
The EU has given Member State 
authorities an important set of tools 
that should be used to their full extent 
to meet the challenges posed by 
terrorist threats. The European Union 
will continue to enhance building EU 
resilience against terrorism.
103 -  ARGUS, a general European 
rapid alert system: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005D
C0662:EN:HTML
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Big data and 
the ‘Internet of  Things’: 
research for Europe’s  
digital resilience
J-P. Nordvik
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Our world is rapidly becoming digital. 
Information and communications technology 
(ICT) is no longer just one economic sector 
among others, but rather the foundation of 
all modern innovative economic systems. 
The internet and digital technologies are 
transforming our life – as individuals, in 
business, and in our communities – as they 
become fully embedded across all sectors 
of our society, including health, education, 
transport, energy and recreation. Key to this 
digital transformation is the tremendous 
amount of data being generated, collected 
and aggregated at unprecedented levels: 
the ‘Big Data’ phenomenon. This trend is 
being accelerated even further with the 
advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) 104, 
that is the pervasive presence of smart 
objects, connected medical devices, 
wearable sensors, and smart home 
appliances, which will increasingly become 
extensions of the human body and will 
generate autonomously mountains of data.
This digital revolution will bring many 
benefits but also new threats to the 
resilience of our society. Digital systems 
and services, like any technology, are not 
100 % reliable and can fail. Moreover, 
they present new risks of malicious 
attacks targeting their vulnerabilities. As 
ICT becomes more and more ubiquitous, 
successful attacks or digital outages will 
have impacts that spread outside the 
technical sphere and extend into all areas 
of our economy and daily life.
The 2013 Cyber Security Strategy of the 
European Union 105 addresses these risks. 
The strategy, towards an open, safe and 
secure cyberspace, contains provisions 
to promote cyber resilience in the EU, 
in particular by establishing common 
minimum requirements for Network and 
Information Security (NIS) 106 at national 
level which would oblige Member States to 
designate national competent authorities 
for NIS, set up well-functioning Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) 107, 
and adopt a national NIS strategy and a 
national NIS cooperation plan. ENISA 108, the 
European Union Agency for NIS, supports 
the European Union, the EU Member States 
and the business community in analysing, 
preventing and responding to NIS problems. 
The European standardisation organi-
sations (ETSI 109, CEN 110, CENELEC 111) are 
working on the development of standards 
for cyber security and, together with the 
European Commission, are stimulating the 
adoption by industry of standards ensuring 
minimum security requirements.
Of course, big data analytics, with its 
capacity to process heterogeneous and 
large amounts of data, can offer extensive 
support to law enforcement and border 
management. EU databases, such as the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) 112, 
the European Union Visa Information 
System (VIS) 113 or the European fingerprint 
database for identifying asylum seekers 
and irregular border-crossers (EURODAC) 114 
are tangible examples of large-scale IT 
systems databases supporting Member 
State authorities in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. 
At the same time, the digital revolution 
must not be allowed to create serious 
104 -  The Internet of Things: http://
www.theinternetofthings.eu/ 
105 -  Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union: An Open, Safe 
and Secure Cyberspace: http://
eeas .europa .eu /pol ic ies /eu-
cyber-security/cybsec_comm_
en.pdf
106 -  Network and information se-
curity (NIS): http://ec.europa.
eu /d ig i ta l-agenda /en /news/
commission-proposal-direc-
t ive -concern ing-measures-
ensure-high-common-level-
network-and
107 -  Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team (CERT-EU): http://
cer t .europa.eu/cer t /plainedi-
tion/en/cert_about.html
108 -  European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Secu-
rity (ENISA): https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/
109 -  European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI): 
http://www.etsi.org/
110 -  European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN): https://
w w w.cen .eu /Pages /defau lt .
aspx
111 -  European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC): http://www.cenel-
ec.eu/
112 -  Schengen Information System 
(SIS): http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/poli-
cies/borders-and-visas/schen-
gen-informat ion-system/in-
dex_en.htm
113 -  EU Visa Information Sys-
tem (VIS): http://eur-lex.eu-
r o p a . eu / l e ga l - co n t en t / E N /
TXT/?uri=URISERV:l14517
114 -  EURODAC: http://eur-lex.eu-
r o p a . eu / l e ga l - co n t en t / E N /
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0603
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imbalances between business entities, 
governments and citizens. An adequate 
balance between healthy business 
growth, national security and individual 
privacy has to be maintained. Since 1995, 
the EU has benefited from solid European 
legislation on the protection of personal 
data. In 2012, in view of the challenge 
raised by the digital evolution, the 
Commission proposed a comprehensive 
reform of the EU’s data-protection rules to 
strengthen online privacy rights, increase 
public trust and therefore boost Europe’s 
digital economy. This proposal aims to 
simplify and streamline data-protection 
rules across Europe, through increased 
harmonisation and a one-stop shop 
for enforcement. Each business will be 
accountable to just one data protection 
authority, and both businesses and 
individuals will have a single point of 
contact. A ‘right to be forgotten’ will help 
people better manage data  protection 
risks online. Whenever consent is required 
for data processing, it will have to be 
given explicitly, rather than be assumed.
In the energy sector, smart metering 
systems are an essential stepping stone 
towards smart grids. They also represent 
the first large-scale deployment of IoT 
in Europe. To maintain the fundamental 
right to protection of personal data and to 
privacy, the European Commission issued 
a recommendation on Data Protection 
Impact Assessment 115 in smart grids 
and smart meters. In this way, European 
competitiveness and fundamental rights 
are maintained, and resilience is created 
in both areas when new technologies 
enter the market.
Reinforcing trust and security in the 
processing of personal data is a key 
element for the creation of the successful 
conditions and a level playing field for 
advanced digital networks and innovative 
services. The EU is addressing these 
challenges through the European Strategy 
for developing a secure and transparent 
Digital Single Market 116, one of the key 
objectives of the current Commission 
agenda. Research in Big Data and IoT is an 
important driver to support the compet-
itiveness of European industry and to 
provide a secure and safe environment 
for the European citizen. Research 
will maintain and further consolidate 
Europe’s innovative and competitive edge 
and underpin the necessary regulatory 
framework adjustments needed to ensure 
sustainable benefits for the EU from the 
Big Data and IoT revolution. 
115 -  Commission Recommendation 
2014/724/EU of 18 October 
2014 on the Data Protection 
Impact Assessment Template 
for Smart Grid and Smart 
Metering Systems: http://
eur-lex .europa .eu/ legal-con-
tent /EN/ TXT/ ?ur i=ur iserv :OJ
.L_.2014.300.01.0063.01.ENG
116 -  Digital Single Market (DSM): 
http: //ec .europa.eu/priorities/
digital-single-market/
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Can Europe become 
quantum-safe?
G. Lenhart
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
Cyber-attacks are a major issue, and 
cyber security is built upon cryptographic 
algorithms, based on hard mathematical 
problems. Such mechanisms are used all 
across the globe to create digital identities, 
to protect digital transactions, or to keep the 
content of electronic messages confidential. 
Hackers do not stop at national borders, and 
in the recent years the success of digital 
technologies has introduced vulnerabilities 
in all areas of our daily life.
Specialists have even managed to gain 
access to a WLAN installation by hacking 
a ‘smart’ light bulb. This is both a security 
issue and a market issue: consumer trust 
is essential for a successful and strong 
digital market, as service providers, 
technology vendors and public authorities 
know well. Knowing the weaknesses of the 
ever-increasing number of IT systems and 
sharing knowledge about how to fix them is 
essential for efficient cyber resilience.
For this purpose, computer emergency 
response teams (CERTs) have been 
established in industry and in the public 
sector in recent years. Keeping knowledge 
up to date in a sector where hundreds 
of thousands of attacks are happening 
every day is not straightforward. CERTs 
need to collaborate, but sharing sensitive 
information requires trust. The EU 
recognised this issue early, and created 
the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) in 2004. To fight 
cybercrime, the European Cybercrime 
Centre 117 was established at Europol in 
2012. In addition, the EU issued the EU 
Cyber Security Strategy and the Network 
Information Security Directive 118 in 2013 
with the objective of making the EU’s 
online environment the safest in the world. 
All these steps have provided the basis 
for trusted information exchange across 
borders in the continued European efforts 
for strong cyber security in a quickly 
changing technology environment.
But cyber resilience also requires looking 
ahead and confronting new challenges 
together. One of these challenges might be 
bigger than anything we can imagine today: 
all across the world, researchers are working 
towards a universal quantum computer. 
 
Such a computer could change the nature 
of computing in profound ways: future 
generations may look at today’s computers 
in the way we look at an abacus. One 
possible effect of such a quantum computer 
would be that it could very rapidly break 
most or all of our current cryptographic 
algorithms. Of course, a quantum computer 
does not exist yet, and if it can be built it 
will certainly take some years to do so – 
but once such a machine was operational, 
no electronic bank transaction, no credit 
card payment, no mobile phone call and no 
computer login would be secure any more. 
This risks creating a global economic crisis 
of unprecedented dimensions.
Recent progress in quantum experiments 
has led some experts to believe that a 
quantum computer could be operational 
as early as 2030. Although even this 
optimistic guess sounds quite far away, 
there is little time to protect ourselves, as 
developing quantum safe cryptography will 
117 -  European Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3): https://www.europol.eu-
ropa.eu/ec3
118 -  Network and Information Se-
curity (NIS) Directive: http://
ec.europa.eu/information_so-
ciety/newsroom/cf/dae/docu-
ment.cfm?doc_id=1666
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take several years. Even the theoretical 
underpinning for such cryptography 
is a challenge: how can we work out 
algorithms robust against technological 
attacks which do not yet exist? And even 
if a solution could be found, it would 
have to find broad distribution to work 
globally and should be standardised to 
be interoperable.
Also here Europe has acted. A new 
working group on quantum safe crypto-
graphy 119 was established in 2014 at 
ETSI, which aims to create global 
technology standards.
Experts have started working against 
the clock to define and agree standards 
to provide robustness against a com- 
pletely new type of attack well before 
such an attack appears. This and other 
aspects of cyber-resilience mechanisms 
have to reach forward for at least 
30 years. Europe has shown its capability 
to join forces on cyber security and 
cybercrime successfully over the first 
decade of the 21st century, and has made 
the first step towards an initiative to 
provide cyber resilience against major 
disruptive technology developments in 
the decades to come.
These developments show the importance 
of the trusted environment and shared 
governance provided by the EU.
119 -  Campagna, M., Chen, l., Dagdel-
en, Ö., Ding, J., Fernick, J., Gi-
sin, N., Hayford, D., Jennewein, 
T., Lütkenhaus, N., Mosca, M., 
Neill, B., Perlner, R., Ribordy, 
G., Schanck, J., Stebila, D., 
Walenta, W., Whyte, W., Zhang, 
Z., Kaiser, S., Pecen, M., Petzold, 
A. and Smith-Tone, D., ETSI 
White Paper Quantum Safe 
Cryptography and Security; An 
introduction, benefits, enablers 
and challenges, ETSI, Sophia 
Antipolis, 2014, ISBN 979-10-
92620-03-0
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The Internal Market:  
protecting 
European innovation
A. Campinos
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM)
Continuous innovation is considered 
essential for competitiveness, and one 
component of economic resilience is the 
creation and protection of new ideas. 
But new ideas and innovative products 
or services are vulnerable in their early 
stages, and without a proper environment 
might not make it to the market even 
in cases where they are economically 
promising: competitors who have shied 
away from investing in innovation might 
copy the approaches or even gain an illegal 
advantage over the intentional production 
of counterfeit products. An environment 
where the results of investing into 
innovation cannot be adequately protected 
will keep large companies, SMEs and 
creative individuals from innovating. The 
easy establishment and strong protection 
of intellectual property rights is therefore 
of central importance for sustainable 
innovation at the European scale.
For this purpose, a protective framework 
is assured across the European Internal 
Market by the coexistence of national 
and European systems, providing options 
for the users and cooperation between 
enforcement authorities. The creators 
of new technologies, designs or brands 
cannot only count on a well-defined 
intellectual property process at the EU 
level, but also on a stable and effective 
regime for its enforcement against 
infringements. In addition, the EU-wide 
framework is being reviewed and adjusted 
to reflect industry’s needs and maintain 
stability for European entrepreneurship, 
and all major EU institutions are involved: 
for example, a provisional agreement 
between the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European 
Council has just recently been reached 
on the trademark reform package 120, and 
the foreseen reform will lead to lower 
costs, increased speed, more predictability 
and greater legal certainty. But also the 
enforcement side is addressed, to make 
sure that legal provisions are implemented 
efficiently. The reform also means for the 
fight against counterfeits, in particular, of 
goods in transit through the EU’s territory. 
In addition to protecting the EU’s internal 
market, this will prevent abuse of the EU 
as a distribution hub for illegal fake goods 
to worldwide destinations.
Also on patents a political agreement 
has been reached, laying the ground for 
the creation of unitary patent protection 
and a unified patent court in the EU. 
The EU patent reform package will provide 
significant advantages for European 
business, enabling companies to receive 
protection in all the 25 participating 
Member States with just one application 
and enforcing this protection under a single 
and specialised patent jurisdiction 121.
But European activities for making the 
innovation process more resilient do 
not stop at the level of legal frameworks. 
As a practical implementation, EU 
Member States and other stakeholders 
are developing the European Trade Mark 
and Design Network 122, in which common 
practices and tools are built and put in 
place across Europe and beyond. The 
achieved assurance of service quality, 
efficiency, predictability and consistency 
120 -  Trade mark reform package: 
http: //europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-4823_en.htm
121 -  Unified Patent Court: http://
www.unified-patent-court.org/
122 -  European Trade Mark and De-
sign Network: https://www.
tmdn.org/
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across the EU are major elements of 
stability for the holders of intellectual 
property rights.
Flagship tools like TMview 123 or Design- 
View 124, the largest free trademark and 
design databases in the world, enable 
searching for applications and registered 
rights in the EU Member States and 
beyond. The respective benefit to 
companies has been calculated to be 
up to EUR 236 million annually, based 
on a scenario of full substitution of 
current similar or identical fee-based 
commercial search services. Moreover, 
European-level fast-track electronic filing 
tools allow for fast and user-friendly 
access to registration of trade marks 
and designs in the EU, including pre- 
clearance functionalities. Introduced only 
in November 2014, the fast-track tool 
has already been used for more than 
27 % of the relevant applications in the 
first quarter of 2015.
All of these tools and collaborations 
facilitate a user-driven system for 
intellectual property rights with a level 
playing field where businesses can 
operate unhindered and well protected 
in all EU Member States. In other words, 
they are making European innovation 
more resilient.
This system is complementing Horizon 
2020, the EU Framework Programme 
for Research and Innovation, aimed 
at strengthening the innovation capa- 
cities of European companies and at 
boosting the creation of new knowledge 
and products. Protecting and managing 
intellectual property rights is important 
for turning this innovation and knowledge 
into market benefits. A strong respective 
national and EU-level system is an 
essential component of the European 
Internal Market, which in turn makes the 
EU economy stronger and more resilient.
123 -  ETMview: https://www.tmdn.
org/tmview/welcome
124 -  EDesignView: https://www.
tmdn.org/tmdsview-web/wel-
come
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Measuring resilience 
to design 
innovative policies
E. Giovannini
University of Rome Tor Vergata
In the recent analytical note ‘Preparing 
for Next Steps on Better Economic 
Governance in the Euro Area’ 125, the 
concept of resilience appears several 
times, with reference to the capacity of 
the Economic and Monetary Union to 
react to external shocks. Moreover, the 
final part of the paper poses the question: 
“Is the current governance framework – 
if fully implemented – sufficient to make the 
euro area shock resilient and prosperous 
in the long run?”
The frequency with which the concept of 
‘resilience’ is used in analytical and policy 
papers has increased greatly over the last 
few years 126. It is derived from a concept 
originally developed in material science: 
“the ability of a material to absorb energy 
when it is deformed elastically, and 
release that energy upon unloading”. From 
a psychological point of view, resilience 
is defined as “an individual’s ability to 
properly adapt to stress and adversity”. 
In ecology, resilience can be used either 
as “the rate at which a system returns to 
a single steady or cyclic state following 
a perturbation” or “the magnitude of the 
disturbance which can be absorbed before 
the system changes to another regime of 
behaviour”. Finally, in economic terms, 
resilience is “the ability of an economy 
to retain function, employment and 
prosperity in the face of the perturbation 
caused by a shock”.
The 2014 Human Development Report 
‘Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing 
Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience’ 127, 
published by the UNDP, recognised that: 
“While globalisation has brought benefits 
to many, it has also given rise to new 
concerns, manifest at times as local 
reactions to the spillover effects of events 
far away. Preparing citizens for a less 
vulnerable future means strengthening 
the intrinsic resilience of communities and 
countries.”
The concept of resilience referring to people, 
economies, environment, institutions, etc. 
is especially attractive from a political 
perspective as it communicates a positive 
message, emphasising the key role of 
policies in building a better future even 
if shocks affect a community. Policies to 
build resilience are especially important 
given the risks highlighted by the medium- 
to long-term scenarios which led the UN 
countries to agree, in September 2015, 
on the Sustainable Development Goals 128. 
As highlighted by the 2015 WEF 129 Global 
Risks report 130: “Since its inception, the 
report has raised awareness that the world 
is increasingly interconnected and that 
global risks cannot be seen in isolation. On 
the contrary, they can have far-reaching 
cascading effects as demonstrated by 
the financial crisis in 2008 and its socio-
economic consequences. The year 2014 
alone witnessed several such risks with 
potentially broad implications in the years 
to come if history serves as a benchmark 
… Successfully addressing these complex 
and interconnected issues necessitates 
greater multi-stakeholder cooperation 
to increase the capacity to foresee, 
manage and mitigate global risks and to 
strengthen society’s preparedness and 
resilience to them.”
125 -  The note was prepared by the 
President of the European 
Commission, in close coopera-
tion with the President of the 
Euro Summit, the President of 
the Eurogroup and the Presi-
dent of the European Central 
Bank: http://ec.europa.eu/pri-
orities/docs/analytical_note_
en.pdf
126 -  The President of the ECB used 
this concept again in May 2015: 
ht tps : / /www.ecb .europa .eu /
p ress / key/date / 2015 / h t ml /
sp150522.en.html
127 -  United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), Human 
Development Report 2014 – 
Sustaining Human Progress: 
Reducing Vulnerabilities and 
Building Resilience, UNDP, New 
York, 2014: http://hdr.undp.
org/sites/default /f iles/hdr14-
report-en-1.pdf
128 -  Sustainable Development 
Goals: https://sustainablede-
velopment .un.org/topics/sus-
tainabledevelopmentgoals
129 -  World Economic Forum (WEF): 
http://www.weforum.org/
130 -  World Economic Forum (WEF), 
Global Risks Report, 10th edi-
tion, WEF, Geneva, 2015: http://
w w w.wefor um .org / r epor t s /
global-risks-report-2015
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Conclusions and next steps
In Europe, concerns about the social and 
the political situations make it very urgent 
to identify and implement innovative 
solutions to stimulate sustainable growth, 
reduce unemployment and social exclusion, 
increase energy efficiency and restore 
sustainable environmental conditions. In 
such a context, the EU institutions have to 
further develop their capacity to foresee 
future opportunities and risks, as well as 
to develop forward looking policies, able 
to reduce vulnerabilities and increase 
resilience, at all levels.
To do that, a truly interdisciplinary 
approach to resilience has to be devel- 
oped, putting people at the centre of 
future developments. Available studies 
show that there are several elements that 
can help developing people’s resilience or 
making an economy or a society react 
quickly to crises. This is why the first 
step to identify and implement policies 
for fostering resilience is to better define 
the concept, from both conceptual and 
statistical points of view.
A working group should be established by 
the European Commission on this topic, 
involving academic experts and interna-
tional organisations active in this field, 
with the aim of developing sectoral and 
overall statistical indicators of resilience. 
The group should also develop research 
to evaluate how structural reforms and 
other policies can build a fully resilient 
Europe, integrating economic, social and 
environmental perspectives in a more 
coherent framework.
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Managing complexity:  
the key to resilience
S. Lechner
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
The financial crisis has demonstrated 
that it is already difficult to assess 
systemic risk in a single business sector. 
The creation and uncontrolled dispersion 
of complex financial ‘products’ together 
with the highly dynamic market obfuscated 
the general picture across the sector, and 
led to a situation where market players 
were simply not aware of their critical 
interdependencies.
But the real big picture needs to span 
across sectors in both business and policy. 
It is clear that today’s global intercon-
nections are not simply sectorial. Almost 
every sector of business and policy is 
connected to many other sectors at a time, 
and most of these sectors are already 
very complex when considered individually. 
Between 2005 and 2015, we have seen 
many examples of effects across sectors 
and across geographic areas:
•  Automated information technology 
algorithms produced a ‘flash crash’ at 
the stock exchanges in 2010, destroying 
billions in different sectors 131; 
•  The default of a key US financial market 
player (Lehman Brothers) finally led to 
several government turnovers in Europe;
•  Government turnovers in Ukraine and in 
North Africa created geopolitical tensions, 
leading to energy supply and migration 
problems – and to enormous costs;
•  A natural disaster off the coast of Japan 
hit a (nuclear) energy installation and 
subsequently changed the energy policy 
in Germany. In addition, it temporarily 
interrupted the production of black cars 
by several producers in the US.
The OECD has underlined the intercon-
nectedness between sectors in its study 
on ‘Future Global Shocks’ 132 (2011), and 
the World Economic Forum regularly 
maps 133 the complex interconnections 
between economic, environmental, social, 
geopolitical and technological risks in its 
annual Global Risks Report 134, which is 
now in its 10th edition.
Globalisation creates opportunities but 
it also creates highly complex depend-
encies, and not all of these interdepend-
encies are useful in terms of resilience. 
A resilient Europe needs to strategically 
build its network of interconnections 
via a smart combination of all available 
tools across policy sectors. Introducing 
additional global interconnections just 
to realise short-term profit and without 
understanding the implications for future 
generations does not create resilience, but 
rather increases the stress on the system.
But there are limits to interconnections. 
Living on a confined planet, it needs to 
be acknowledged in all resilience consid-
erations that today’s simplistic focus on 
growth cannot carry on forever. Scientific 
modelling and simulation are essential to 
analyse this complex picture, to understand 
what the limits are, and to provide a robust 
basis for solid policy decisions.
The EU has demonstrated on many 
occasions (and in many policy areas) that 
it is able to establish resilience procedures, 
providing significant benefits to its 
Member States. While some mechanisms 
inevitably work better than others, at 
131 -  U.S. Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) and 
U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Findings 
regarding the market events 
of May 6, 2010: report of the 
Staffs of the CFCT and the SEC 
to the joint advisory commit-
tee on regulatory issues, CFTC 
and SEC, Washington, Septem-
ber 2010: http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies /2010/market-
events-report.pdf
132 -  OECD Reviews of Risk Man-
agement Policies, ‘Future 
Global Shocks: improving risk 
governance’, OECD, Paris: 
http: //www.oecd.org/govern-
ance/48329024.pdf
133 -  The Global Risks 2015 In-
terconnections Map: http://
repor ts .weforum.org /global-
risks-2015/#frame/10e05
134 -  World Economic Forum (WEF), 
Global Risks Report, 10th edi-
tion, WEF, Geneva, 2015: http://
w w w.wefor um .org / r epor t s /
global-risks-report-2015
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the very least the EU provides a strong 
platform for collaboration among its 28 
Member States, and sometimes beyond. 
This platform supports existing policy 
areas and can also be used to address 
future issues, including cross-cutting 
ones. At the core of the platform are 
the EU Treaties, signed by all 28 EU 
Member States, which provide common, 
trustworthy governance for all, based 
on common values, and the institutions 
created and supported by these Treaties. 
The EU is well prepared, and has proven 
its resilience on many occasions. In many 
other regions of the world, nations would 
have to start from scratch if they wanted 
to come to a supranational agreement 
on just one urgent policy issue.
Under future tight global competition and 
with an essential need for collaboration 
among trustworthy partners, staying 
resilient will not be easy. It will require a 
suitable political framework and a forward-
looking approach towards the close align- 
ment of policy instruments in different 
areas. And it will need continued solidarity 
among like-minded, reliable partners.
The next step for European resilience 
considerations could be to try to cut 
across policy areas and to mainstream 
resilience into all of them. This will 
demand a good understanding of the 
limits of the planet’s resources and of the 
impact of measures in one policy sector 
on neighbouring sectors. In tomorrow’s 
world, which can be expected to be 
even more complex and interconnected 
than that of today, this task will only be 
feasible with solid scientific support in 
terms of modelling and simulation.
Conclusions and next steps
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Global risk 
and global resilience
W. J. Ammann
Global Risk Forum
The combination of the world’s growing 
economy, accelerated urbanisation and 
expanding globalisation is leading to 
increased vulnerability and thus aggravat-
ing the risk potential for all communities 
and nations worldwide.
Fukushima has impressively revealed 
how a single natural hazard can trigger 
cascading effects, which can mount up 
to drastic losses for people and cause 
enormous damage to people and the 
economy, and erase technologies – not 
to forget about the very-long-lasting 
impact on ecosystems, the foundation for 
our human life and welfare. The overall 
risk landscape is constantly changing 
and becoming more and more complex 
at an accelerating pace. The exponential 
demand in energy, water, and resources 
in contrast to their limits, emerging 
new political constellations, increasing 
migration due to economic and social 
disparities or environmental degradation, 
the still growing divergence of the 
financial markets and the real economy, 
the decoupling of production and markets, 
respectively of the primary, secondary 
and tertiary sector, emerging diseases 
and a healthcare infrastructure stressed 
by pandemics economic volatility, risks to 
cyber-infrastructure, decaying physical 
infrastructure, demographic changes with 
a constantly ageing population, and many 
other reasons are increasingly causing 
national, regional and global tensions and 
risk patterns, which ask for new strategies 
and alliances. Yet we have no choice, but 
must also accept that climate change, 
desertification and loss in biodiversity 
will heavily influence global risk patterns, 
affecting all sectors of our communities in 
every region of the world, and gravely increase 
humanity’s overall vulnerability to  risks.
It is obvious that our societies have not 
had the time to adapt to such rapid global 
change. We live in a world of increasing 
dynamism and volatility, where technology 
and greater interconnectedness have 
accelerated change and altered the way 
people live. It is therefore necessary to 
adapt current practices and develop 
strategies that adequately respond to 
modern critical threats, and to the limits of 
our planet in terms of resources and waste 
absorption capacity.
Despite the many emerging risks with an 
alarming increase of human and economic 
losses in recent times, fortunately there 
are also many new achievements in risk 
reduction and disaster management 
strategies in recent years. A unified process 
for global collaborative risk reduction 
and disaster management efforts is 
increasingly gaining acceptance. In May 
2014, the OECD adopted recommendations 
on the governance of critical risks 135. The 
UN World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction, held in March 2015 in Sendai, 
Japan, has led to promising commitments 
of the many member states on how to 
cope with risks and disasters on national, 
regional and even global scales 136. And 
there is hope that the UN Climate Change 
Conference COP21 137 in Paris at the end of 
2015, the debates on the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, and the UN World 
Humanitarian Summit 138 in the next couple 
135 -  OECD (2014): Council Recom-
mendation on the Governance 
of Critical Risks: http://www.
o l i ver w yman .com/ ins ight s /
publications/2014/may/oecd-
recommendation-on-the-gov-
ernance-of-critical-risks.html#.
VV4f1kaukhQ 
136 -  UNISDR, Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030, UNISDR, 2015; 
document A/CONF.224/CRP.1, 
18 March, 25p: http://www.pre-
ventionweb.net /f iles/43291_
sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf
137 -  UN Climate Change Confer-
ence COP21: http://www.cop21.
gouv.fr/en
138 -  UN World Humanitarian Sum-
mit: https://www.worldhumani-
tariansummit.org/
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of months will further progress and 
enable promising solutions towards a 
resilient society.
As some of the threats listed above have 
the potential to substantially destabilise 
or even lead to the partial collapse of our 
global economy and social welfare, it is 
important to strengthen their stability 
by all means, in particular by favouring 
resilient systems and procedures.
Following the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
definition for resilience 139, it is “the 
capacity of individuals, communities and 
systems to survive, adapt, and grow in 
the face of stress and shocks, and even 
transform when conditions require it”.
Building resilience requires joint action 
and shared responsibilities at local, 
national and international levels, by 
the public and private sectors, local 
communities and non governmental 
organisations – a trilateral cooperation. 
Such a holistic, trans-sectorial approach 
will facilitate the development of 
systems and processes that will allow 
for economic, political, and structural 
resilience and stability. Governments have 
a responsibility to develop and resource 
strategies to support the resilience of 
their populations and infrastructure, and 
to meet the needs of future generations.
Concerted action is thus required. 
The European Commission, with its 
dedicated focus on ‘Better Regulation’ 140 , 
is in an excellent position to provide 
the necessary platform for a trilateral 
partnership and cooperation between 
the Commission and Member States, the 
private sector, and civil society to develop 
the necessary strategy for a holistic 
resilience approach. And as substantial 
research efforts are still needed, the 
Commission and its Member States 
can also provide a valuable test bed to 
study the most effective and efficient 
measures to strengthen resilience. In the 
future, transborder and trans-sectorial 
effects will increase in frequency and 
intensity. Member States, the private and 
the civil sector can substantially profit 
from a concise EU resilience strategy, 
which recognises and rewards the value 
of resilience to individuals, households, 
communities and countries. It also 
requires a commitment to a new vision 
that includes shared responsibility for 
resilience and one that puts resilience 
at the forefront of the European Union´ s 
public policies.
139 -  Rockefeller Foundation, Build-
ing Climate Change Resilience, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 2009: 
see http://www.rockefeller-
foundation.org/our-work/top-
ics/resilience/ accessed 15 
March 2015
140 -  Better Regulation: http://
ec .europa .eu /smar t-regula-
tion/index_en.htm
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Resilience through 
trilateral collaboration
J. Jacometti
Jacometti Associates
In our modern and globally interconnected 
world, it is clear that no country can work 
towards resilience in splendid isolation. 
Developing resilience strategies means 
building reliable alliances with others, 
based on a profound understanding of the 
limits of our planet.
As a supranational organisation, using 
its right to propose European legislation, 
the European Commission is uniquely 
positioned to significantly improve resilience 
in EU Member States by engaging collabo-
ration and solidarity mechanisms across all 
policy domains.
This was a main finding of the workshop 
‘Thinking the Impossible’ hosted by the 
JRC in May 2014. Stakeholders from 
academia, NGOs and industry came 
together to discuss resilience issues 
and to consider predictions of possible 
societal collapse.
The workshop participants discussed 
the interactions between environmental 
challenges, limits on natural resources, 
instabilities in the economy and in 
financial markets, and challenges to social 
cohesion. The approach of most economic 
actors at present is that of maximising 
short-term profit and leaving ‘others’ – 
whoever they are – to manage the risks. 
To change this approach will require a 
step change in the collaboration between 
governments, industry and NGOs.
Several prominent voices 141, 142, 143    have 
raised similar opinions in the recent past. 
Their concerns are being acknowledged 
more and more, recognising that there 
are major challenges ahead, and that the 
time to address them is short.
Trilateral collaboration and the 
Commission’s Better Regulation initiative
The regulatory framework in which busi-
nesses operate is a key factor for a suc-
cessful future. The European Commission’s 
Better Regulation initiative and its objective 
“to deliver EU policies and laws, which bring 
the greatest benefits to people and busi-
nesses in the most effective way”, should 
consider resilience as one of its elements. 
This would create a regulatory framework 
targeted at solidarity and collaboration in 
all policy domains, providing significant 
added value for the EU Member States.
But the governmental approach alone 
will not be sufficient. A collaboration 
between the private sector, public services 
and NGOs is required, as presented in our 
workshop ‘Global Resilience – Trilateral 
Collaboration’ in  January 2015, with par-
ticipants from the European Commission, 
national government, the corporate sector 
(including energy, chemicals, financial, public 
relations and business assurance) and 
NGOs, (including The Transition Network, 
the European Climate Foundation, the 
Fraunhofer Society, the Global Risk Forum 
and the Institute for Integrated Economic 
Research private-sector work on resil-
ience was also presented and discussed 
on this occasion 144, 145, 146. The goal of close 
collaboration across different stakeholder 
communities is achievable, given inspiring 
leadership. The successful collaboration in 
141 -  Professor Sir John Beddington, 
http://www.govnet.co.uk/news/
govnet/professor-sir-john-bed-
dingtons-speech-at-sduk-09
142 -  Wolf, M., The shifts and the 
Shocks: What we’ve learned – 
and have still to learn – from 
the financial crisis, Penguin 
Press, New York, 2014
143 -  ‘Is global collapse imminent?’, 
Research Paper Series No. 
4, August 2014, Melbourne 
Sustainable Society Institute, 
University of Melbourne, Mel-
bourne, 2014: http://sustaina-
ble-dev.unimelb.edu.au/sites/
default / f i les /docs /MSSI-Re-
searchPaper-4_Turner_2014.
pdf
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the period around 2003-2009 between 
government, business and civil society, 
focusing on sustainable mobility, is 
an example, which led to fuel effi- 
ciency improvements well beyond those 
expected. The regulations implementing 
these improvements have had a major 
global impact, since they have become 
an important point of reference for 
countries outside the EU.
Creating a step change in trilateral 
collaboration across the EU and beyond
To significantly enhance resilience in 
the light of global systemic risks, it 
is necessary to build on the initiatives 
mentioned above, and develop a step 
change in trilateral collaboration.
Concrete next steps must be embedded 
into an institutional setting and should 
include:
•  Selection of ‘change agents/champions’ 
in government, the corporate sector and 
civil society
•  Cooperating with these change agents 
to engage their organisations and 
their respective sectors in the analysis 
of resilience
•  Development of an in-depth under-
standing of what lifestyle changes are 
needed, including decarbonisation and 
relocalisation, and of how to ensure they 
happen
•  Assessing the potential of the inter-
net, social media, etc. to initiate global 
change and to enhance the convergence 
of social and technological innovation, 
whilst involving both the public and 
private sector
•  Developing senior leaders’ understand-
ing of resilience analysis. An example 
could be taken from the military sector, 
which uses immersive scenarios, 
in combination with a ‘war-gaming’ 
approach, to effectively address 
complex challenges.
Concerted efforts are required, and the 
ideal starting point for a resilient and 
competitive future for Europe could be 
the new European Commission’s focus on 
Better Regulation.
In the eyes of the author, the European 
Commission should take the lead.
144 -  Shell Scenarios: http://www.
shell .com/global/future-ener-
gy/scenarios.html
145 -  DNVGL Group, Next – a safe 
and sustainable future, DNV GL 
Group, 2014: http://issuu.com/
dnvgl/docs/next_a_safe_and_
sustainable_future/1
146 -  European Climate Foundation 
initiatives: http://europeancli-
mate.org/home/how-we-work/
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Abstract
Resilience determines the capacity to successfully deal with difficult 
events and to adapt and overcome adversity. It creates stability in 
a changing world which in turn promotes job creation, economic 
growth and environmental sustainability. Resilience is a fundamental 
prerequisite for Europe as the largest integrated economic area in 
the world and has an important social dimension which requires the 
active cooperation of all stakeholders; citizens, the private sector, 
governments and NGOs included.
This report discusses the concept of resilience from different 
perspectives and the role of science in the continuous process of 
building a resilient, stable, competitive and prosperous Europe. 
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